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This Major Paper was written to satisfy component 5.0 in Amanda Turner’s official Plan 
of Study for the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University in Toronto, Ontario. 
Component 5.0 states that the final Major Paper will consist of a thorough examination of the 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions made by China at the UNCCC in 2015. There are 
2 learning objectives specified within this component; 5.1. To gain sufficient knowledge in 
China’s United Nations Climate Change Conference 2015 Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions and target dedications, and 5.2. To analyze the feasibility, both politically and 
economically, of policies created by China as a result of their commitment to achieving their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. The component and its associated learning 
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In December 2015 at the 21st Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Paris, 195 countries signed to the world’s first comprehensive 
climate change agreement; The Paris Agreement. Subsequently 155 of these countries have 
ratified the agreement. This is makes apparent the global consensus that global climate change is 
fast becoming the most important issue facing our world today. Being the largest contributor to 
global emission, China is a significant player in this agreement and therefore their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions merit a closer examination. Under the SWOT framework, 
China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions have been subjected to a critical policy 
analysis, a comparative analysis, and a feasibility study. From this, there is a determination of the 
likelihood of implementation. While it is determined that the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions are relatively feasible for China, there are complications in relation to the domestic 
enforceability of the policies that would result from changes made to current policy. The 
National Government recognizes the need for more enforceability of policies, however, it 
remains questionable as to whether coherent and cooperative enforcement will be achievable.   
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Climate change, though still seemingly a largely debated topic, is nearly unanimously 
agreed upon in the scientific community as a stark and dangerous reality. While the term ‘climate 
change’ encompasses both natural causes of statistical changes in global climate and 
anthropogenically caused changes, it is widely accepted in the scientific community that there is, 
in fact, a change in global or regional climate patterns and that it is attributed largely to the 
increased levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide produced using fossil fuels1. Anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era. This is determined largely 
by economic and population growth. From 2000 to 2010 emissions were the highest in history2. 
Historical emissions have driven atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide to levels that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years and this has led to 
an uptake of energy by the climate system3. For the purpose of this paper, therefore, ‘climate 
change’ refers to the anthropogenically caused changes to global climate, which are largely 
considered the most significant problem, because it is understood that these changes are 
accelerated due to human consumption and production of greenhouse gasses (GHG) and carbon 
dioxide (𝐶𝑂2) emissions.  
What is concerning about climate change is that it is causing a global effect of increased 
global temperatures that are fundamentally changing weather patterns, air quality at ground level, 
and even physical geographic alterations. Warming of the climate system is unmistakable. The 
atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level 
has risen4.  
                                                                
1 Yamin, F., & Depledge, J. (2004). The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
Procedures . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2 IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 151. (R. K. Pachauri, & L. A. Meyer, Eds.) 
Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
3 (IPCC 2014)Ibid. at 44 
4 (IPCC 2014) Ibid. at 47 
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 Due to the fact that the scientific community was able to discern that, as prior mentioned, 
the key anthropogenic contributing factor most influential is that of air pollution, namely through 
GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions, it is easy to understand, therefore, that it is humanity’s responsibility to 
manage this potentially disastrous climate change through reduction of emissions.  Thankfully, 
carbon dioxide emissions and air pollution are controllable, though it requires dedication and 
large efforts from every country in the world. While the efforts to fight climate change and 
reduce overall global GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions lay mostly on national governments the world 
over, there are two leading bodies that assist them with assessment of the overall issue, and 
whether or not the efforts made are making a difference.  These bodies provide a forum for 
intergovernmental collaboration in policy making. They are both institutions of the United 
Nations and are governed by the countries who are signed to the United Nations, therefore. 
These bodies are the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations 
Climate Change Convention (UNCCC).   
China is one of the leading contributors to climate change due to their significant carbon 
footprint, accounting for roughly 28% of the overall global 𝐶𝑂2 emissions
5.  Surpassing the 
United States in 2014 by nearly doubling them6. However, despite their massive contribution to 
global emissions, China’s national government is working with the aforementioned international 
bodies to ultimately reduce their global emissions contribution.  
The most recent evidence of China’s dedication to climate change and emissions 
reduction can be found in their contributions to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference held in Paris in December 2015. All countries who are participants, and who have 
signed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, are required to submit 
to the conference, for review and discussion, their individual efforts; in the form of specific goals 
and targets disclosed called: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). China’s 
                                                                
5 Boden, T. A., Marland, G., & Andres, R. J. (2017). Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Retrieved from United 
States Environmental Protection Agency Website: https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-
gas-emissions-data 
6 PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. (2017). One-Pager on Global CO2. Retrieved from PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency: http://infographics.pbl.nl/website/globalco2-2015/ 
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INDCs were submitted ahead of the conference and boast significant changes that will be made 
on China’s behalf at the National Government level in China 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to uncover whether, or not, the most recent INDCs 
submitted by China will have any effect on both policy making in China and on their reduction 
of carbon dioxide emissions. As well as to shed light on an existing paradigm surrounding 
China’s enforceability of their environmental policies. To determine this, there are several 
questions that will be addressed within the paper:  
Research Questions and Aims 
 
The most significant question that was addressed by this paper, through an in depth 
critical analysis and feasibility study, is: Are the targets set out in China’s INDCs at the UNCCC 
in 2015 feasible within their proposed timeframe goal of 2030?   
However, in order to inform this question other matters needed to be addressed alongside 
it. It is of importance that it be determined what the overall targets set out at the UNCCC Paris 
Agreement is, in general, and if China’s INDCs are feasible within that target. Yet, more 
significantly perhaps, is the issue of whether, or not, China’s INDC targets will be feasible given 
current actions, policies and technologies within the country. In conducting the feasibility study, 
special attention was paid to what the economic impact of striving to achieve their INDC targets 
is and whether it is feasible politically therefore. Lastly, in terms of feasibility, it is of significant 
importance that this study examined whether the policy outcomes of China’s INDCs are 
realistically enforceable, and as such, are they likely to be enforced? This particular question 
leads to whether, or not, China’s INDC targets are realistic, when comparing them to China’s 
past actions, policies, goals and their achieved outcomes. 
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 It is also beneficial to the discussion of this paper to examine, through a brief but 
informative comparative analysis, what other countries with similar targets have set out in their 
INDC documents in their efforts to reduce global carbon emissions. Finally, this paper will 
attempt to determine what is realistic for China, and potentially, what needs to be changed in 
directing their INDCs. 
Research Method and Framework 
 
Given that policy research is both macro and micro level, the lens in which this paper was 
framed is that of an analysis of the INDCs policy formation and enactment. The study was 
conducted using the SWOT Framework. It involved specifying the objectives of China’s INDC 
and identifying the internal and external factors that are favorable, or unfavorable, to achieve that 
objective. The SWOT framework was beneficial because it allowed for the understanding of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats posed within the INDC and China’s goals, and 
helped to identify their potentiality for achieving climate change mitigation. Under this 
framework, three research methods; a critical analysis, brief comparison analysis and feasibility 
study were conducted in an attempt to decide whether this particular piece of policy, China’s 
INDC, was capable of forming new policy for China that is enactable. These three methods had 
fit within the SWOT framework naturally as they act to determine the same purpose. Research 
was conducted using much of the information available on what China’s current and past climate 
change or environmental policies, strategies, practices, technologies and economics are and 
examined them alongside the INDC to understand the INDC and its feasibilities.  
Various academic sources were used in the background accumulation stage of this paper. 
It should be noted that different sources highlighted the different subjects examined; such as 
academic Journals and China’s Governmental reports and data were used to develop an 
understanding of policies, strategies, practices and technologies. United Nations data was used in 
regard to understanding China’s INDC and UNCCC information. World Bank data was 
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examined to understand China’s economics and technologies, and lastly, various books and 
articles about climate change were used in the understanding of climate change in general.  
During the critical analysis, comparative analysis and feasibility study, the INDC 
document, submitted to the UNCCC in June 2015, was used directly as well as three of China’s 
own national policy pieces; the 12th and 13th 5-year plans and the National Climate Change 
Programme (NCCP). 
China issued their first NCCP document in June 2007. The NCCP document was the 
country's first global climate change policy initiative. It prompted the government, and 
significant actors, to adopt its measures, affecting areas of law, economy, administration and 
technology, which when all combined aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and instill 
within the country, a flexible approach to climate change. The policy document set out the basic 
principles, objectives, policies and measures to address climate change up to 2010 and so its 
usefulness to this paper is in the content of the policy but also in that its effectiveness can be 
assessed and measured.  
The 5-year plan policies are China’s most significant policy pieces, laying out the 
national government’s longer-term priorities. The plans carry significant weight as it seems that 
all major actors: provincial and local governments, banks and big companies, seem to attempt to 
align themselves to these plans and often change their strategies and actions to match them. The 
12th 5-year plan was additionally advantageous to this paper because its time limit has lapsed and 
therefore it provided insight into what was achieved by China in its specific time frame. The 13th 
5-year plan is the most recent policy enacted in China and covers the time frame of 2016-2020 
and so is relevant to the potential enactment of China’s recent INDC. 
All three national policy pieces provide the forum for INDC implementation as they, 
similarly, provide policy mechanisms that can be changed to include those set out in the INDC. 
Various journal articles and statistical data were used, additionally, to add context and validity to 
these sections as well.  All sources throughout the entirety of the paper were published within the 
last decade, from 2007 to 2017 which keeps this study recent and relevant. The oldest outlying 
reference dates to 2004, however, it remains academically significant and thus it is included. 
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The critical policy analysis examines China’s INDC in greater detail and draws on 
outside data in related journals and Chinese policy to gain a deeper understanding of the policy 
implications. The comparative analysis covers four comparative countries’ INDC documents 
drawing out the similarities found between them and China’s INDC, as well as the ambitiousness 
of China’s INDC goals. The topics examined in determining feasibility are: economic, 
environmental, political, schedule (timing), and technical. When all the information had been 
gathered, and analyzed, it was possible to decide on whether the proposed INDC policy changes 
are a worthwhile venture to create and enact new policy from. 
Literature Review 
 
Imperative to the discussion in this research paper, is the providing of a significant 
background understanding of China’s current and past efforts regarding climate change and 
reduction of emissions. Therefore, the literature reviewed in this section will focus on four main 
background topics; economic background, strategies, practices and policy background. This 
background research not only lays the groundwork for determining the feasibility of the INDCs’ 
potential for new policy development, but also sheds light on an existing paradigm of 
enforcement of policy in china.   
In first attempting to understand the economic trends, and inevitably, understanding the 
economic boundaries that may be present in conducting an economic feasibility one must 
consider the over all economic state of China. The World Bank is the most well-known platform 
for uncovering the state of a country’s overall economic standing, and therefore was the first 
source consulted. They provide brief descriptions for each country on their website and from this 
it was revealed that GDP growth in China has averaged nearly 10% per year7.  
This, according to the World Bank, is the fastest sustained expansion of a major economy 
in history. Accordingly, China has reached all of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
                                                                
7 World Bank Group. 2017. World Bank Countries: China; Overview. 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#1 
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set out by the World Bank, as of 2015. China has also become the second largest economy in the 
world, and plays a significant role in the global economy8. However, due to the fact that China’s 
per capita income is still far below that of advanced countries, and its market reforms are to date 
incomplete, they are still only considered a developing country. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
covering the time between 2011 and 2015, as well as their newly approved 13th Five-Year Plan 
projecting between 2016 and 2020 forcefully address issues regarding environmental imbalances 
such as setting targets to reduce pollution and to increase energy efficiency. The annual growth 
(GDP) target in the 12th Five-Year Plan was 7 percent and the growth (GDP) target in the 13th 
Five-Year Plan is 6.5 percent9. China currently is projecting to double their GDP by 202010.  
Along with providing an overview of current situations for countries, the World Bank 
publishes periodic update reports on country economies. In their most recent 2016 report, East 
Asia and Pacific Economies Update, they reveal that China’s GDP grew by 6.7% within the first 
half of the 2016 fiscal year, however this is down 0.2% in 201511. What is most interesting to 
note is that the service sector in China has all but replaced the manufacturing sector as the 
economy’s primary driver. The service sector generated 54% of the overall GDP for the country 
in the first half of the 2016 fiscal year12. This could have some favorable effects on the likelihood 
of China’s government placing focus on environmental and climate change policy, but may also 
detract from production of renewable or clean energies.   
China’s GDP growth is expected to continue curbing, as structural adjustments and 
policy efforts to address accumulated financial vulnerabilities move ahead13. The government 
has projected an official growth target of 6.5 to 7.0 percent for 201614. Growth is expected to 
steadily moderate from 6.7 percent in 2016 and 6.5 percent in 2017, assuming continued reforms, 
both to enable economic restructuring, as well as, to address the vulnerabilities built up since the 
                                                                
8 (World Bank Group 2017) Supra. Note 7 
9 (World Bank Group 2017) Supra. Note 7 
10 (World Bank Group 2017) Supra. Note 7 
11 World Bank. (2016, October). Reducing Vulnerabilities. East Asia and Pacific Economies Update. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0991-0 
12 (World Bank 2016) Ibid. at 115 
13 (World Bank 2016) Ibid. at 116 
14 (World Bank 2016) Ibid. at 116 
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global financial crisis.15A key short-to-medium term challenge facing China’s economy will be 
to address the buildup of financial risks and to facilitate orderly deleveraging of the economy.16 
Policies, such as those regarding environment and climate change, may have some negative 
short-term impacts on overall growth, however they are essential for satisfying speedy growth 
over the longer terms. Likewise, delaying these policies might also increase their overhead costs 
in the future. In order to attempt to alleviate some of the negative economic effects of 
environmental and climate change mitigation polices and strategies, a specific economic strategy 
is currently being employed by China, and other countries around the world. Moarif and Rastogi 
highlight not only what market-based climate mitigation policies are available, but also have a 
special section on which of these policies and strategies China has been using, in their report 
Market- Based Climate Mitigation Policies in Emerging Economies. 
 For the purpose of their paper, and the understanding of the definitions of a market- 
based climate mitigation policy, this term is defined as a policy or strategy that provides financial 
enticement for the consumers, as well as the producers, who are responsible for green house gas 
(GHG) emissions to espouse lower-emitting behaviors or technologies.17 Most enticements carry 
the goal of removing some of the financial barriers associated with mitigation actions. Most 
markedly, in this case, attention is paid to the higher cost of renewable energy and the higher 
initial costs of energy efficient investments.18 Moarif and Rastogi point out that China has 
adopted industrial development support policies which are focused on the development of seven 
new strategic and emerging industries, three of which relate to GHG mitigation; which includes 
new energy; in the form of nuclear, solar, wind and biomass. As well as energy saving and 
environmental protection policies and strategies and making more significant the use of clean 
energy vehicles.19 They highlight that nearly 50% of china’s GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions come from 
three main sources; (Coal) Power Generation, Steel production and cement manufacturing.20 
                                                                
15 (World Bank 2016) Supra. Note 11 at 116 
16 (World Bank 2016) Supra. Note 11 at 116 
17 Moarif, Sara, and Namrata Patodia Rastogi. 2012. Market-Based Climate Mitigation Policies in Emerging 
Economies. Arlington VA: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 
18 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Ibid. at 1 
19 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Ibid. at 10 
20 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Ibid. at 10 
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Therefore, the Market-Based policy instruments spoken toward in their article target these 
sectors. 
 Moarif and Rastogi imply that China is making use of three specific market-based 
climate mitigation strategies; 1. Trading systems, namely a cap-and-trade project. According to 
the report, in 2012 seven pilot regions were selected for the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 
China based on their per capita income, mature market systems and infrastructure, and strong 
political will and support. Facilities in covered sectors would need to participate in the program 
if they emitted over 10,000 tons 𝐶𝑂2 per year on average in the 2009-11 period, however those 
below the threshold could participate voluntarily.21 However, beyond the pilot programs, not 
much is uncovered regarding whether or not the trading scheme has been working. Aside from 
providing the explanation that monitoring and registries have been set up, Moarif and Rastogi 
have not given any substantial information about the mechanics of such a scheme, and especially 
not results.  2. Subsidies, namely direct subsidies to manufacturers and consumers, feed-in 
tariffs, restricted and encouraged lending and preferential financing22. As with all subsidies, the 
goal is to encourage both consumers and producers to sign onto more environmentally friendly 
ends. Some of the subsidies China is offering cover benefits to consumers and producers who 
make use of vehicles with low-fuel consumption, hybrid and electric vehicles, as well as energy-
efficient appliances, solar photovoltaic (PV) power projects and the production of wind 
turbines23. No additional data is supplied here, again, by the authors of this report and so it 
cannot be determined whether the subsidy programs are benefiting the GDP. 3. Taxes, namely 
tax incentives and differential electricity pricing24. Moarif and Rastogi provide and excellent 
chart describing the pros and cons of each of these types of market- based climate mitigation 
strategies and make it easy to determine if these particular strategies and policies worked for 
China in the past (see Figure 1 in appendix).  
                                                                
21 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 11 
22 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 11 
23 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 12 
24 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 13 
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 It is interesting to note that China has accomplished a 19.1% reduction in energy 
consumption per unit of GDP output after their 11th Five Year Plan25; the most significant piece 
of environmental policy in china and which is periodically revisited every few years.  The 11th 
Five Year Plan was set to focus between the years 2006 to 2010 and had established a target to 
reduce the economy’s energy intensity, or energy consumption per unit of GDP output, by 20% 
between 2005 and 2010.26 It leaves one to wonder, therefore, if this is attributed to their use of 
market-based climate mitigation policies and strategies overall. One should take caution, though, 
in using this information for economic oversight as Moarif and Rastogi do not source 
information on actual monetary gains or loses from these programs and thus it can only be 
presumed, given by percentages, that the GDP is effected significantly by these policies and 
strategies.  
One of the most prominent ways of achieving climate change mitigation and emissions 
reduction in China is through governmental enacted policy, as was hinted to in the economic 
background.  It is important to gain a significant background, therefore, on the area of current 
and past policy actions in China. Not only is it important to the context of this research paper, but 
it is also important because this paper, likewise, intends to determine if new policy development 
will be a feasible and a worthwhile venture for China based on their newest ambitions found in 
their INDCs.   
Through this background research it was discovered that there are three levels of 
government in China responsible for the development, enactment and enforcement of policies 
pertaining to climate change; National, Provincial and Municipal. While all three levels of 
government seem to promote environmental and climate change mitigation policies, there are 
some very clear discrepancies between policy ambitions and enforcement.   
The National Government in China has undertaken many efforts to promote their 
dedication to climate change mitigation and to reduce their global emissions footprint. They 
willingly participate in United Nations Climate Change Conferences and have drafted many 
                                                                
25 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 10 
26 (Moarif and Rastogi 2012) Supra. Note 17 at 10 
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National policies over the years to attempt to address these issues. According to Ming-Teh, et al, 
in China’s Response to Climate Change: A Policy Analysis, roughly in the 1990s, China had 
begun setting up several special institutions devoted to responding to climate change. The 
leading institution for China’s efforts in producing policies to respond to climate change is the 
National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC). This institution is responsible 
for the establishment of China’s policy Agenda 21 – White Paper on China’s Population, 
Environment, and Development in the 21st Century.27 This piece of policy is regarded as the 
policy that set China’s overall strategic framework for sustainable development and contributes 
to efforts on issues of climate change, though it encompasses more than issues of climate change 
and is not necessarily policy that places specific rules of practise.  
Another influential policy piece is that of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Again, the plan 
highlights some specifics in terms of paying attention to climate change, but does not specify 
targets directly.  The National Climate Change Programme is China’s first policy document in 
full response to climate change, which was introduced in 2007.28 The paper states in detail 
China’s response policies towards climate change before 2010, including the mid-term reduction 
target of one billion tons of greenhouse production.29 In the same year, China introduced the 
report Scientific and Technological Actions on Climate Change, corresponding to the National 
Programme’s emphasis on technological advancement and innovation as important measures to 
be taken in response to climate change.30 
While it is very clear that the National level of government in China expresses a 
significant dedication to climate change policy action and mitigation, they are not the only level 
of government with the power and responsibility to enact policy in this regard. It is even 
significant to mention that provincial and municipal governments hold a significantly more 
powerful position in terms of the actual enforcement of policy for the country and in the outcome 
                                                                
27 Ming-Teh, Hung, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu. 2011. "China's Response to Climate Change: A Policy Analysis." 
Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 3 (2): 362-375 
28 (Ming-Teh and Liu 2011) Ibid. at 370 
29 (Ming-Teh and Liu 2011) Ibid. at 370 
30 (Ming-Teh and Liu 2011) Ibid. at 370 
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of real climate change mitigation and emissions reduction. Therefore, they are deserving of a 
greater investigation. 
According to Zheng, et al, in their article The Impacts of Provincial Energy and 
Environmental Policies on Air Pollution Control in China; several provincial governments of 
China responded to the national government’s environmental protection activities. Provincial 
governments are taking an increasingly significant lead in shaping the policies that are meant to 
aid in climate change mitigation and reduction of emissions. Many of their policy actions have 
been focused on cleaner production, energy saving and comprehensive resource utilization.31 
Zheng, et al, suggest that this has been mostly accomplished through revisions of local standards 
for emissions reduction policies. Their study uses statistical data to demonstrate the relationship 
between provincial governments’ energy saving and emission reduction policies and local air 
pollution outcomes. With respect to the national government’s Energy Conservation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, 4 provinces enacted provincial energy saving regulations. This set 
the groundwork for several other provinces to follow suit in later years.  
What is notably interesting is that, while provincial governments have taken policy action 
toward achieving national government promoted laws for environmental protection and climate 
change, many of the provinces shape their level of commitment to emissions reduction. Zheng, et 
al, indicate that provincial government regulations are consistent with normal policy and contain 
various chapters such as introductions to universal rules, incentive schemes and legal liabilities, 
however they also contain unique characteristics reflecting individual provincial situations. Two 
examples were given by Zheng, et al; the energy saving regulations of Guangdong province 
openly encourage the development of renewable energy via solar, ocean and wind energy, so that 
local renewable resources can be employed. However, the regulations of Shanxi province, who 
have historically depended on its natural coal resources, required the adoption of gauge power 
generation and comprehensive utilization, and the application of energy-efficient manufacturing 
technologies instead.32 This adds question to the ability of universality of the national 
                                                                
31 Zheng, Shiming, Hongtao Yi, and Hui Li. 2015. "The impacts of provincial energy and environmental policies 
on air pollution control in China." Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49: 386-394. 
32 (Zheng, Yi and Li 2015)Ibid. at 390 
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government’s environmental protection laws. If provinces can tailor make their own regulations, 
they can easily disregard parts of the national government’s laws and only apply what they will 
find works for them. However, this still implies that provinces can, and do, influence the 
environmental protections and climate change regulations which is instrumental in achieving 
promoted climate change mitigation.  
Another key piece of national government legislation that is used in the Zheng, et al, 
study in determining whether, or not, the provincial regulations have any effect on carbon 
emissions reduction is that of the Cleaner Production Promotion Law, which made provinces 
subject to cleaner production audits, those of which are also are mandatory for key polluting 
enterprises.33 It is indicated that 8 provinces have enacted cleaner production regulations within 
their boundaries following the enactment of this law.  
In their concluding discussion, Zheng, et al, suggest that these provincial level policies 
play a vital role in actual reduction of carbon emissions for the provinces that have enacted them. 
Their study shows that; therefore, the provinces play a crucial role in enforcing national 
government laws and that regulations coming from provincial governments actually do present 
results.   
However, as mentioned before, there is a significant discrepancy in the enforcement of 
policy actions. Both provincial and national governmental policies are still subject to 
interpretation, as it were, at municipal level. It should be noted that all three levels of 
government seem to promote the increased need to devote policy and actions to environmental 
and climate change. Municipal governments, however, have notably failed to live up to their own 
promotion of environmental and climate change ambitions, as evident in at least two significant 
studies on the failure of China’s policies on climate change and emissions reduction.  
 The most notable take away from Wu, et al, in Incentives and Outcomes: China’s 
Environmental Policy, is that of the highlighted fact that while the importance of environmental 
protection was repeatedly emphasized by the National government, evidenced in the Five-Year 
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Plans, local governments allocated less resources to urban environmental improvements.34 This 
seems to be something rather significant to note in terms of success chance regarding 
environmental and climate policy, as there is an apparent disconnect from the national 
government’s policies and the actual execution by local governments. What is shown by Wu, et 
al, is that investment in transportation infrastructure, such as roadways, bridges and public 
transportation, took precedent in the budgets of local governments.35 Also of significance is 
understanding the correlation of environmental improvement investment on local air quality. In 
their paper, Wu, et al, discuss using a graph, the significance (see Figure 3 in appendix), here is 
that it is important to notice that there is as positive correlation, as suggested by Wu, et al. This 
means that as local governments invest in environmental improvements, their city’s air quality 
improves.36 What is striking, though is that it would make sense that investment in transportation 
infrastructure would worsen air quality as more vehicles would likely be used and more 𝐶𝑂2 
inevitably would be produced. So, the question is raised, why is it that promotion of 
environmental infrastructure investments is so high by the national government, as well as the 
global promises made by China, yet local governments barely, if at all invest any of their budgets 
on these improvements and instead invest on more polluting?  
Wu, et al, hint toward this in their concluding discussions. They suggest that spending on 
transportation infrastructure raises both GDP growth and land prices.37 It seems that land lease 
sales are local governments’ major source of additional revenues and policies that raise land 
prices local governments survive, given the discrepancy of their heavy spending responsibilities 
and insufficient fiscal transfers coming from central government.38  This gives local governments 
an additional incentive to favor transportation infrastructure.  Investing in environmental 
improvements has no such advantageous consequences.39  
                                                                
34 Wu, Jing, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung. 2013. "Incentives and Outcomes: 
China's Environmental Policy." NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA: U.S. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, February. 
35 (Wu, et al. 2013) Ibid. at 1-3 
36 (Wu, et al. 2013) Ibid. at 33 
37 (Wu, et al. 2013) Ibid. at 26 
38 (Wu, et al. 2013) Ibid. at 26 
39 (Wu, et al. 2013) Ibid. at 26 
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In the working paper to the World Bank, by Genia Kostka; Barriers to the 
Implementation of Environmental Policies at the Local Level in China, the idea that there is a 
discrepancy in enforcement of national government laws at the local, municipal level is 
reinforced. Kostka’s study involved in person interviews with over 190 government officials, 
business managers, and civil society representatives and encompassed various levels of 
administration.40 This makes the study unique in its perspective in terms of a policy analysis, and 
subsequently, instrumental to understanding the barriers that exist here.  
Kostka echoes what Wu, et al, suggested; that local realities indeed do not necessarily 
account for national ambitions. What Kostka has revealed in the working paper, regarding local 
municipal governments, is that leading officials have repeatedly focused on satisfying economic 
growth targets, rather than creating policies that satisfy national government emissions reduction 
ambitions. As a result, environmental pollution continues to get worse in many Chinese cities.41 
Kostka, additionally, indicates that shortcomings in China’s planning system and policy 
instruments, as well as, weak economic and political incentives for local implementers are major 
contributing barriers to implementation and enforcement of national climate change and 
environmental laws.42   
Low levels of public participation and private sector involvement and insufficient 
implementation capacities of local agencies in charge of policy implementation also effect this 
evident discrepancy.43 Of key consideration, and significantly important, for understanding why 
this discrepancy exists regarding implementation and enforcement at the municipal level is the 
idea Kostka presents; that that sociocultural and behavioral factors may also stand in the way of 
achieving national environmental and climate change ambitions.44 While governments can 
promote the necessity for policies regarding sustainability and emissions reduction, the society 
                                                                
40 Kostka, Genia. 2014. "Barriers to the implementation of environmental policies at the local level in China." 
Policy Research Working Paper. Vol. 7016. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/102001468220778402/Barriers-to-the-implementation-of-
environmental-policies-at-the-local-level-in-China . 
41 (Kostka 2014) Ibid. at 6 
42 (Kostka 2014) Ibid. at 13 
43 (Kostka 2014) Ibid. at 43 
44 (Kostka 2014) Ibid. at 43 
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does have a significant role to play in its outcome. Kostka suggests that there are three patterns in 
terms of individuals’ perceptions of what constitutes a good city, as well as the values and norms 
that shape these perceptions; 1. While people are aware of what constitutes a sustainable city, 
they often prefer to live in a modern Chinese city45. 2. The striving of individuals to lead a 
modern, comfortable life has led to a strong focus on consumption, which is a leading 
contributor to increased emissions46.3. Cities of assorted sizes are striving to upgrade their 
cosmopolitan status by renewing core areas with modern, mono-functional business districts and 
in this way, they don’t place significant attention on emissions reduction, due to placing it 
therefore on growth.47  
Even though a very evident discrepancy is shown, it is also still significant to note that 
policy is the main avenue for China to attempt to act on climate change. That being said, policy 
has so far seemed to fail them in achieving lasting outcomes.  
Fan, et al, undertake a critical analysis in their article; The failure of China's Energy 
Development Strategy 2050 and its impact on carbon emissions. The particular piece of policy 
regarding china’s efforts on emissions reduction; China's Energy Development Strategy 2050 is 
the focus of their paper.  In their analysis, they attempt to portray that this policy ultimately 
ended up being a failure, though it has not completely reached its targeted deadlines yet. China’s 
Energy Development Strategy was enacted in 1985 and is set, as all energy development 
strategies, to predict and reach particular consumption goals by 2050. The strategy document 
covers the scale and structure of the supply and demand of energy. It also outlines strategies 
promoting energy conservation and sustainable utilization, and maintaining energy security.48  
These strategies place significant attention on concerns for population, GDP, import and 
export amounts, urbanization, industrial structure, energy prices and registered vehicles and 
policies along with energy goals.49 While one would think that such a comprehensive strategic 
                                                                
45 (Kostka 2014) Supra. Note 40 at 33 
46 (Kostka 2014) Supra. Note 40 at 33 
47 (Kostka 2014) Supra. Note 40 at 33 
48 Fan, Jie, Qiang Wang, and Wei Sun. 2015. "The failure of China's Energy Development Strategy 2050 and its 
impact on carbon emissions." Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review 49: 1160-1170. 
49 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Ibid. at 1161 
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policy would only lead to success, Fan, et al, have determined in their study that the goals for 
2050 are completely unattainable through the strategies set in this document. Their reason for 
this determination is that there was a fundamental underestimating in the drafting of the targets.  
The underestimations are revealed as mainly being on sustained rapid economic growth, 
and maintained rapid urbanization.50 Therefore, because these key factors were underestimated, 
the strategies simply could not work, given that the entire document does not account for the 
actual levels of growth in these areas. This raises the question of whether other policies drafted 
by china, be it at national, provincial or municipal level, likewise underestimate the rapid growth 
of the economy and urbanization in China? Leaving one to wonder then if all policy in China 
currently is set to fail. However, Fan, et al, have also indicated that China has made great 
improvements with regards to slowing population growth, reducing energy consumption per unit 
of GDP, and reducing energy consumption by increasing the amount of clean energy resources.51 
This has ultimately created a better result for carbon emissions reduction.  
Fan, et al, suggest in their concluding discussion that while this particular piece of policy 
should be revised now instead of later and use actual levels rather than the old predictions, some 
other key issues should be addressed. Their recommendations are as follows; 1. Energy 
efficiency should be improved by means of industrial restructuring and technological progress.52 
2. Energy use structure should be optimized by employing more of the available renewable 
energy sources abundant in china.53 3. Universal energy conservation should be promoted by 
encouraging the development of public transportation and alternative energy vehicles, strictly 
controlling the per capita housing area of urban and rural residents, and vigorously pursue the 
use of green building materials and energy-saving, environmentally friendly materials.54 
Achieving these changes, and even instilling them in government policy, will greatly effect the 
                                                                
50 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Supra. Note 48 at 1169 
51 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Supra. Note 48 at 1169 
52 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Supra. Note 48 at 1169 
53 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Supra. Note 48 at 1169 
54 (Fan, Wang and Sun 2015) Supra. Note 48 at 1169 
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ability for china to achieve future strategic energy development goals. Therefore, consideration 
of these recommendations will be evident in the critical analysis and feasibility studies to follow.  
While policy is the main instrument for actions on climate change and emissions 
reduction in china, it is also significant to understand the role that technology plays in reaching 
policy goals. A report that was put together by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology; 
China’s Scientific and Technological Actions on Climate Change, that highlights several realities 
on what China is doing in terms of the technological approach on reducing GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 
emissions.   
Of significance to the understanding of China’s advancement of science and technology 
regarding climate change, it is important to note that China’s national government has created 
several projects that specifically govern the research and development sectors pertaining to 
reduction of emissions and climate change. The report points to three particular projects; the 
National Hi-tech Research and Development Program, the National Basic Research Program and 
the National Key Technologies Research and Development Program, as spearheading the focuses 
of global climate change prediction and its impacts, response strategy and technologies, 
technologies for use of clean and efficient energies, for energy saving and efficiency, and for 
exploitation of new and renewable energies.55 
The report indicates that these projects are responsible for the research and development 
of the following technologies; 1. Energy saving and energy efficiency technologies, 2. New and 
renewable energy technologies, 3. Clean and efficient coal exploitation and utilization 
technologies, 4. Exploration and clean/efficient development and utilization technologies of 
Petroleum, natural gas and coal bed/mine methane, 5. Advanced nuclear technologies, 6.  𝐶𝑂2 
capture, utilization and storage technologies, 7. Biological and engineering carbon sequestration 
technologies, and 8. GHG emission control technologies through good agricultural and land-use 
practices56. 
                                                                
55 Ministry of Science and Technology : China. 2007. China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate 
Change. China Association for Science and Technology . 
56 (Minsitry of Science and Technology 2007) Ibid. at 6 
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 While this is all very interesting to know, the report fails to identify what has actually 
been implemented or developed. Due to this lack of information, the report is only significant in 
terms of it outlining that these projects exist. Lacking anything substantial regarding 
technologies being used currently in China, it is therefore imperative to the technological 
feasibility portion of this Major Paper that greater identification be revealed.  
As Takahiro Ueno highlights in his report; Technology Transfers to China to Address 
Climate Change Mitigation, addressing climate change requires global responses because its 
inevitably global nature. With the report undertakes to examine seven key mitigation 
technologies that have been transferred and implemented in China; Supercritical and ultra‐
supercritical coal fired power plants, Natural gas combined cycle power plants, 
Photovoltaic power generation, Wind power, Waste heat recovery for steel and cement plants, 
Energy efficient room air conditioners, and Compact fluorescent lamps.57 Here it is shown that 
there are some very real technologies being used, and even manufactured in China.  
In regard to the transfer of technology, Ueno speaks of two specific methods for transfer 
of these technologies. Technology licencing is the most frequent method for technology transfer, 
as well as, joint ventures and purchasing production equipment,.58 Ueno contends that the most 
important factor effecting technology transfers is that of diffusion. While policy is in place to 
transfer technologies, the diffusion of the technologies throughout China is hindered in terms of 
its policy implications59. There are policies in place to help incentivize the diffusion of these 
technologies, however, like most national government policies in China, there is still some 
discrepancy between the policy and the implementation or enforcement of said policies. In 
Ueno’s closing statements, it is suggested that China may become a leading manufacturer of 
these seven clean energy technologies, if diffusion and production can increase through policy 
enforcement in the coming years60.  
                                                                
57 Ueno, Takahiro. 2009. Technology Transfers To China To Address Climate Change Mitigation. Japan: 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry: Climate Policy Program at RFF. 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-09-09.pdf. 
58 (Ueno 2009) Ibid. at 3 
59 (Ueno 2009) Ibid. at 8 
60 (Ueno 2009) Ibid. at 20 
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Having provided a significant background understanding of China’s current and past 
efforts regarding climate change and reduction of emissions, it is clear to see that there is a 
discrepancy in China’s policy making and its execution. Keeping this in mind, however, China is 
pursuing a new approach through their most recent IDNCs to the UNCCC and therefore there is 
a chance that all levels of government can work together to mitigate their global emissions 
contribution through their technological and economic strategies, as well as additional policy 
making. The imminent feasibility study and critical analysis of China’s INDCs aims to uncover 
just how possible this may be.  
Critical Policy Analysis of China’s Intended 
Nationally Directed Contributions (INDCs) 
 
To understand the feasibilities of China’s INDCs it is important to take a closer look at 
what the country has promised to implement into their national policy. As outlined in the INDC 
document submitted by China to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
(UNCCC); and subsequently ratified into the Paris Agreement in 2016, there are four overhead 
Goals of China’s INDCs. These goals are the comprehensive intention of China’s INDCs and 
every other target outlined within the document are mechanisms to reach them. Therefore, it is 
crucial to examine these four main goals, as well as many of the targets used as mechanisms to 
reach these goals, and critically analyze them. The INDC document itself does not supply one 
with much more than the promises themselves, and so additional sources of national policy will 
be looked at alongside this document in critically thinking about them; such as the current 13th 5-
year plan, the 12th 5-year plan that ended in 2015 and the National Climate Change Programme 
(NCCP). Additionally, throughout the critical analysis, various papers and articles will be 
referenced for supplementation of information.  
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A. To achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 
2030 and making best efforts to peak early 
This means China is currently emitting a significantly high amount of 𝐶𝑂2, roughly 
10,641,789 kilotons (Ktons) in 2015 or 29.5% of the global total61, and cannot simply reduce 
their emissions immediately after the INDCs have been ratified into the Paris Agreement 2016. 
However, with proper measures in place, in the near future China can reach a year from which 
the amount of emission starts to reduce. That year is called the peaking year and as is seen by 
this dedicated goal, that will be 2030. Some of the mechanisms for achieving this goal that are 
set out as targets in China’s INDC are:  
1. Implementing Proactive National Strategies on Climate Change 
It is important to recognize that this mechanism is already being implemented by the national 
government in China. In 2007 China created the National Leading Group on Climate Change 
(NLGCC), which entails leading and managing nearly 30 national government agencies known 
as ministries, commissions, administrations, and offices as they coordinate policies and actions 
on climate change.62 Since 2009 China’s government has been actively passing climate change 
and environmental sustainability policies at the national level.  These policies contain strategies 
for the mitigation and control of climate change and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions.  The three most influential 
and significant national policy pieces regarding climate change in China right now are the 
National Program on Climate Change (2014-2020), the 12th 5-year plan (2011-2015) which 
contains several sections regarding climate change and sustainability, and the most recent 13th 5-
year plan (2016-2020). The challenge to this mechanism is enforcement of these policies.  
2. Improving Regional Strategies on Climate Change 
                                                                
61 Olivier, J.G.J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Muntean, M. and Peters, J.A.H.W. 2016. Trends in global CO2 emissions: 
2016 Report. European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Directorate C - Energy, Transport and 
Climate; PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Hague., Novemeber. 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/news_docs/jrc-2016-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2016-report-103425.pdf 
62 Ye Qi, Li Ma, Huanbo Zhang and Huimin Li. 2008. "Translating a Global Issue Into Local Priority: China's 
Local Government Response to Climate Change." The Journal of Environment and Development 17: 397-400. 
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It is again important to recognize that many regional or provincial governments, as well as local 
governments, throughout China have created their own climate change initiatives and policies, 
insofar as it pertains to reducing their emissions. Many of them have been pursuing these aims 
since the latter half of 2007.63 These regions include provinces that created special task forces to 
lead in, manage and deliberate on climate change and/or energy saving and pollution reduction 
for their region. They are Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Fujian, Gansu, Hainan, Hubei, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Sichuan, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Tianjin, Jilin, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Shanghai, Hunan, 
Guizhou, Chongqing, Liaoning, Guangxi, Jiangxi, and Yunnan.64 As was discussed in the 
literature review, the provinces tailor their legislation to the needs of their respective provinces. 
Nevertheless, the provinces are displaying support to the national level policies and taking a role 
in achieving the goal of peaking early, as well as reduction of emissions. The challenge faced 
here, however, seems to be in gaining support for these regional or provincial policies and 
initiatives at the local level, and finding funding. Additionally, gaining more provinces in the 
pursuit of this goal is always an issue. 
3. Increasing Financial and Policy Support  
Probably one of the most significant mechanisms for achieving the implementation of policy in 
China for climate change at all levels of government is that of financial support. Implementation 
and enforcement of policy is what will see to the goal of peaking early, and subsequently 
reducing emissions. Financial support is the most significant factor for municipal level 
government, but is also significant for all levels of government. At the very least, however, it is 
the most significant factor in municipal enforcement of either national or provincial policy, as 
well as making policy of their own. Presently, economic growth at local level is the most 
important measure of a municipal government’s ability to prove they have done something 
during their governance and maintain their reputations.65 This is problematic when it comes to 
the environment, including climate change, and social equity. The past has shown that climate 
change has been sacrificed by municipal governments in their attempts to achieve economic 
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growth.66 Therefore it is clear that if municipal governments are to begin to take climate change 
policy seriously and enforce and implement it at their level of government, funding will need to 
be made available as an incentive. Many national climate change programs and initiatives are 
often funded by international sources, it would not be much of a stretch to funnel that funding to 
the regional or municipal levels, likewise. Any level of government must be able to fund the 
initiatives that are born to achieve the overhead goal of peaking GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions early.  
4. Improving Statistical and Accounting System for GHG Emissions 
This mechanism is critical to being able to determine whether, or not, this goal has been or is on 
target to being achieved. As it stands now there is a significantly poor statistical and accounting 
system for GHG emissions in China. Attempts have been made in major cities like Beijing to 
account for and produce statistical data for 𝐶𝑂2 but they fall largely behind IPCC standards and 
do not account for all GHG emissions.67 As it currently stands, there are about seven different 
methods used in China to keep track of GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions (see Figure 4 in appendix). Each 
method accounts for different GHG emissions, and contain different standards for accumulating 
data. This is problematic in terms of consistency and accurate reporting. It is also important to 
note that most of the tracking happens at the provincial level, where as it should be occurring at 
city level since this is where the most GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions come from.
68 Currently only 
provincial level cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqin, are participating in GHG 
and 𝐶𝑂2 emissions accounting.
69 A universal standard should be adopted by all provinces and 
cities across China. Having an effective system for obtaining statistical data on emissions is not 
only important for knowing what the true state of emissions are, but it also provides a means of 
accountability and enforcement, to some degree. Therefore, it is crucial to China’s success in 
achieving their peak in emissions by improving this system.  
5. Broadening Participation of Stakeholders 
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Weather Forcasting 2 (2) 
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Aside from the obvious governmental stakeholders, it is important to consider that there are 
many more significant stakeholders that will be effected by policy in China. The very definition 
of a stakeholder for this purpose is: a group or organization that maintains an interest, legal 
responsibility, or everyday role in developing and implementing climate change adaptation 
strategies and related initiatives.  This includes the citizenry who are effected in their jobs, 
health and livelihoods. But, it must be noted that there are many non-governmental organizations 
that will be impacted by policy changes in China, such companies that emit GHG and 𝐶𝑂2. To 
broaden their participation in the policy actions and decision-making processes, China has 
outlined in their INDC specific methods to do so, and interestingly there is heavy emphasis on 
public participation. Some of these methods include increasing the obligation of  business 
enterprises to adopt low-carbon development, strengthening the role of public supervision and 
participation in low-carbon development through related education and training and to fully 
utilize the function of schools, communities and civil organizations to advance this, as well as 
using platforms such as National Low Carbon Day to raise public awareness of low-carbon 
development throughout society, and encouraging the voluntary actions of the public to combat 
climate change.70  
When examining this overhead goal, it is important to note that none of the comparison 
countries have made mention to a peak year in their carbon dioxide emissions, however it is 
generally accepted that 2030 should be the goal for all countries. This goal is both significant and 
discouraging. On the one hand having this drafted into an agreement allows those countries 
signed to it to continue to emit GHGs and 𝐶𝑂2 essentially unabated until 2030 in which point 
reduction must become evident. On the other hand, it defines a clear-cut year in which the 
signees must produce results in their reductions, and gives them time to implement infrastructure 
and policy to do so. Moreover, having this goal specifically outlined in their INDCs indicates 
that China does not expect to be able to produce any real emissions reduction for another 13 
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years. When that 13 years has passed, this indicator year does not have any specific numbers 
attached to it in terms of reduction. Therefore, assumingly, a 0.001% reduction in the year 2031 
is significant reduction based on 2030 being the peak year. While the goal is ambitious, with 
only 13 years to create infrastructure and policy adjustments, one can be skeptical of the goal 
being clearly stated as it has here for China. This goal is not mentioned in either the 12th or 13th 
5-year plans nor in the NCCP, therefore it is exclusive to the INDC. 
 
B. To lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 
60% to 65% from the 2005 level 
The goal is specific in its purpose, to reduce 𝐶𝑂2 emissions per GDP by 60-65% from 
2005 levels. In 2005 emissions by China were 6174716.60 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2. 71 Much like the first 
overhead goal China’s INDC document does outline mechanisms it will use to achieve this goal 
as well. These mechanisms are as follows: 
1. Building Energy Efficient and Low-Carbon Industrial System 
This mechanism in China’s INDC outlines the need to build a stronger low-carbon industrial 
system. This is perhaps one of the most influential factors in lowering China’s overall 𝐶𝑂2 
emissions, as industrial emissions output is the highest contributor. What is interesting is that this 
mechanism highlights that China plans to effectively control emissions from key sectors 
including power, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, building materials and chemical industries 
through energy conservation and efficiency improvement.72 However, it is noteworthy to shed 
light on the fact that it does not cite a definitive way in which it will do so. It is also highlighted 
in the INDC that China’s national government will promote low-carbon development in 
agriculture; by controlling fertilizer and pesticides as well as methane and nitrous oxide in 
farmlands, and the service industry; by actively developing low-carbon business, tourism and 
                                                                
71 European Comission. 2016. CO2 time series 1990-2015 per region/country. November 28. 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2015. 
72 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 8 
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food services and suggesting that the service industry conserve energy and reduce carbon 
emissions.73 
2. Controlling Emissions from Building and Transportation Sectors 
It is surely inevitable that cities will continue to grow in China over the coming years, as they are 
a growing nation, therefore it is very proactive of China to consider building cities to be more 
climate change friendly. Some of the methods that the INDC highlights to achieve this 
mechanism are; accelerating the construction of low-carbon communities in both urban and rural 
areas, promoting the construction of green buildings and the application of renewable energy in 
buildings, improving low-carbon supporting facilities for equipping communities, as well as 
exploring modes of low-carbon community operation and management.  Moreover, a hardline 
commitment to promoting the share of green buildings for newly built buildings of cities and 
towns to reach 50% by 2020.74 This is significant in reducing the consumption of carbon and 
could see a significant reduction in  𝐶𝑂2 overall.  
More importantly in the urban environment is the  𝐶𝑂2 emissions from vehicle transportation. 
Given that populations in the cities are so high, it is easy to understand that the sheer number of 
vehicles on the road would also be high. Data suggests that there has been a consistent surge in 
vehicle sales in China since 1990 that reflect a growth of private vehicle ownership at a rate of 
20% per year.75 In the People's Republic of China on Climate Change second national 
communications in 2004, it is recognized that 𝐶𝑂2 emissions from transportation activities was 
around 415.74 million tons, accounting for 7.5% of the total emissions in China for that time 
period.76 With a growth rate of 20% vehicle ownership per year, it can be assumed that this 
number has greatly increased. Therefore, this mechanism highlights the need to proactively 
mitigate this issue as well, to achieve the overhead goal of reducing  𝐶𝑂2emissions. Some 
methods outlined in the INDC are; to improve the quality of gasoline and to promote new types 
                                                                
73 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 8 
74 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 9 
75 (Gu, Li and Cook 2014) Supra. Note 67 at 4 
76 (Gu, Li and Cook 2014) Supra. Note 67 at 4 
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of alternative fuels, to develop a green and low-carbon transportation system, optimizing means 
of transportation, properly allocating public transport resources in cities, giving priority to the 
development of public transportation and encouraging the development and use of low-carbon 
and environment-friendly means of transport.77 Additionally, a hardline commitment to promote 
the share of public transport in motorized travel in large and medium sized cities reaching 30% 
by 2020 is stated.78 To help lower costs to the public the INDC also states a method of promoting 
the development of dedicated transport networks for pedestrians and bicycles in cities and to 
advocate green travel.79  
 
3. Promoting the Low-Carbon Way of Life 
This mechanism also brings to attention the need for public participation in achieving the 
overhead goals stated in the INDC. China recognizes the significance of its population in its 
overall emissions, as clearly made evident by its continues emphasis on public participation. The 
INDC highlights methods such as enhancing the education of all citizens on achieving low-
carbon ways of life and consumption and promoting low-carbon consumption throughout 
China’s society.80 As well as encouraging the public institutions to take a lead in promoting low-
carbon ways of life in government buildings, campuses, hospitals, stadiums and military 
camps.81 These public institutions will additionally take actions to moderate consumption, 
encourage the use of low-carbon products and curb extravagance and waste.82  
 This overhead goal is very ambitious, and would it be an incredible achievement for 
China to reach it. It is noteworthy to mention that similar efforts and goals have been made in 
                                                                
77 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 10 
78 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 10 
79 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 10 
80 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 11 
81 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 11 
82 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 11 
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China’s national policy prior to the 2015 INDCs. In the 12th 5- year plan specified targets of 16% 
reduction in energy intensity or energy consumption per unit of GDP and 17% reduction in 
carbon intensity or carbon emissions per GDP are cited.83 Both of these targets were set to 
compare to 2010 levels and were to be reached by 2015. Similar goals were outlined in China’s 
NCCP, where a target of approximately 20% reduction of energy consumption per unit GDP by 
2010, and consequently a reduction in 𝐶𝑂2  emissions is indicated.
84 According to the 
International Center for Climate Governance, China was able to achieve an 18.2% reduction in 
energy intensity and 20% reduction in carbon intensity by 2015.85  This means that China was 
successful in achieving both their NCCP and 12 5-year plan goals. The current 13th 5-year plan 
does mention again a similar goal to that in the 12th 5-year plan, of a reduction in energy 
intensity by 15% and a reduction in carbon intensity by 18%.86 Both goals are set to compare to 
2015 levels and to be reached by 2020. It is interesting to note that the 5-year plans allow China 
to set shorter term goals and measure their achievement consequently. Given that there is 
obvious policy already in place for reductions in emissions it is clear to see that the national 
policy is equipped to adopt this new overhead goal of their INDC using the aforementioned 
mechanisms for policy changes.  
C. To increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 20% 
 
This overhead goal seems to be a means to the end of China’s emissions reduction 
overhead goal; however, it is a significant goal because it displays that China is dedicated to their 
overall emissions reductions and global environmental impact. It sets a hardline goal of reducing 
                                                                
83 Lewis, Joanna. 2011. "Energy and Climate Goals of China's 12th Five-Year Plan." Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions website. March. https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energy-climate-goals-china-twelfth-five-
year-plan.pdf 
84 National Development and Reform Commission. 2007. "China's National Climate Change Programme." 
China Climate Change Website. june. http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf 
85 Davide, Aurora D’Aprile and Marinella. 2016. Climate policy highlights: China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and other 
recent developments. Venice: International Center for Climate Governance. http://www.iccgov.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/2016.04.14_Seminar_Davide_DAprile.pdf. 
86 (Davide 2016) Ibid. at 4 
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the share in primary energy of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) and increasing the share of non-
fossil fuels to 20%. In 2013, approximately 83% of the share of primary energy was coal fueled87 
(see Figure 7 in Appendix). Respectively, oil was 13% and gas was 3% of the primary energy 
consumption.88 However, in 2014 the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption 
jumped to 11.2%.89 Even though this overhead goal itself seems to be a mechanism for achieving 
a 60-65% reduction in emissions, it is in fact a standalone goal and China’s INDC document 
does outlines mechanisms for achieving it. These mechanisms are as follows:  
1. Building Low-Carbon Energy System 
The main direction this mechanism takes is that of reducing the carbon output of coal power in 
china. Many of the policy changes or initiatives highlighted under this mechanism in the INDC 
document make mention to this. What is interesting about this mechanism, though, is that it also 
highlights China’s move toward changing their main energy source. It highlights initiatives such 
as expansion of the use of natural gas and achieving more than 10% share of natural gas 
consumption in the primary energy consumption by 2020, as well as promoting the development 
of hydro power, nuclear power, wind power and solar power.90 It also sets hard targets such as 
achieving an installed capacity of wind power reaching 200 gigawatts, the installed capacity of 
solar power reaching around 100 gigawatts and the utilization of thermal energy reaching 50 
million tons of coal equivalent by 2020.91  
2. Promoting Carbon Emission Trading Market   
The most notable target for this mechanism is that of advancing low-carbon pilots in provinces 
and cities. Currently China has seven local low-carbon pilots in place, with varied results. These 
low-carbon pilots are done through a cap-and-trade apparatus. China is the first developing 
                                                                
87 (Olivier 2016) Supra. Note 61 at 36 
88 (Olivier 2016) Supra. Note 61 at 36 
89 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 7 
90 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 7 
91 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 7 
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country in the world to attempt to control local 𝐶𝑂2 emissions through a cap-and-trade system.
92 
In terms of their ability to work, nearly all regulated companies fulfilled their obligations to their 
emissions ‘caps’ in the first pilot year93, however, trading was very thin in the same first year of 
the pilots and there were significantly different prices from pilot to pilot leaving data inconsistent 
and hard to compare.94  Perhaps this is the reason why the mechanism highlights the need for 
building upon the carbon emission trading pilots. As suggested in the INDC document, China 
hopes to steadily implement a nationwide carbon emission trading system and gradually establish 
the mechanism so that the market plays a pivotal role in resource allocation.95 Lastly, the 
mechanism suggests that there is a need for development of a system for reporting, verifying and 
certifying carbon emissions and improvement of rules and regulations for carbon emission 
trading.96 Achieving this will ensure openness, clarity, fairness and justice in the operation of the 
carbon emission trading market. 
This overhead goal is also mentioned in all the important policy pieces regarding climate 
change in China. The NCCP specifically mentions optimizing China’s energy mix by developing 
low-carbon and renewable energy. The NCCP highlights the need for support in the development 
and utilization of new and renewable energy. Currently china is working to develop biomass, 
solar, geothermal and wind power in appropriate areas.97 The NCCP highlights that the share of 
coal in China’s primary energy mix has decreased from 76.2% in 1990 to 68.9% in 2005.98 
China’s 12th 5-year plan sets a target of Increasing non-fossil energy to 11.4%.99 Lastly it is 
mentioned again in the 13th 5-year plan where a 15% share of non-fossil fuel energy in primary 
                                                                
92 Ringius, Lasse. 2015. Emissions trading in China: Early lessons from low-carbon pilots. August 17. 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/emissions-trading-china-early-lessons-low-carbon-pilots 
93 (Ringius 2015)Ibid. 
94 (Ringius 2015)Ibid. 
95 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 14 
96 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 14 
97 (National Development and Reform Commission 2007) Supra. Note 84 at 9 
98 (National Development and Reform Commission 2007) Supra. Note 84 at 9 
99 (Lewis 2011) Supra. Note 83 at 1 
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energy consumption is cited. In 2010 the approximate share of non-fossil fuel energy was around 
12%, therefore China had achieved its 12th 5-year plan goal.100  
D. To increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion 
cubic meters on the 2005 level.   
 
As of 2003 China’s forest cover was roughly 18.21% or about 12.46 billion cubic 
meters101, and China has not seen particularly devastating deforestation in recent years due to 
policy action in China’s 5-year plans. According to China’s INDC achievement discussion, the 
forested area and forest stock volume have since increased by 2.188 billion cubic meters 
compared to the 2005 levels.102 This is largely a result of the policies China has implemented. 
The 12th 5-year plan contains the target to increase the rate of forest coverage by 21%.103 The 
NCCP indicates the need for optimizing the target-oriented management responsibility system 
for afforestation by governments at all levels and forestry sectors, and to accelerate the 
formulation, amendment, and time line of forestry related laws and regulations; including 
development of regulations on conservation of natural forests, transfer rights of forests, forest 
products, and forest land use.104 It also places emphasis on the need to enhance the 
implementation of laws and regulations by improving the system, strengthening inspections, and 
expanding social supervision of law enforcement.105 The 13th 5-year plan does not indicate this 
overhead goal specifically, but does put attention on it as an INDC main goal and therefore 
supports it by extension. Additionally, China’s INDC outlines a specific mechanism for this 
overhead goal:  
1. Increasing Carbon Sinks 
                                                                
100 (Davide 2016) Supra. Note 85 at 5 
101 The State Forestry Administration, People's Republic of China. 2009. People's Republic of China Foresty 
Outlook Study. Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/am256e/am256e00.pdf 
102 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 3 
103 (Lewis 2011)Supra. Note 83 at 3 
104 (National Development and Reform Commission 2007) Supra. Note 84 at 45 
105 (National Development and Reform Commission 2007) Supra. Note 84 at 46 
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As with previous mechanisms, an emphasis on public participation is placed in this mechanism. 
The INDC specifically outlines that there is a need for vigorous enhancement of afforestation.106 
It suggests that promotion of voluntary tree planting by citizens would greatly enhance this, but 
also the continuation of the implementation of key ecological programs such as; protecting 
natural forests, restoring forest and grassland from farmland, strengthening forest tending and 
management and increasing the forest carbon sink.107 As with previous mechanisms, an emphasis 
on public participation is placed in this mechanism. The INDC specifically outlines that there is a 
need for vigorous enhancement of afforestation. 
Comparative Analysis 
 
The understanding of feasibility of China’s most recent INDCs will require some 
comparative analysis. This analysis is mostly significant for giving validity to the ambitiousness 
of China’s INDC, but will also provide concrete examples of similar circumstance and the 
outcomes of these circumstances. Therefore, a comparison will be done between China and four 
other INDCs. The United States of America, the European Union, India and South Korea INDCs 
will be referenced in comparative data. By examining INDCs by these four other parties to the 
UNCCC, as well as their similarities and differences in policy enforcement and development, a 
deeper understanding for potential feasibility will be available.  
How China’s overhead goals compare with the four other countries is very interesting. 
Each country’s INDC goals for emissions reduction are vastly different from each other, despite 
having the same overall goal of global emissions reduction, and some of the comparative 
countries lack the structure and elaboration found in China’s INDC. This speaks volumes to the 
ambitiousness of China’s INDC and displays a varying level of commitment.  
                                                                
106 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 10 
107 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015)Supra. Note 
70 at 10 
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United States of America 
 
The United States of America has been a historically significant contributor to global 
GHG emission due to their significant production and consumption habits and an investigation 
into their reduction strategies and policy ambitions will be a noteworthy indicator of their ability 
to reduce their  𝐶𝑂2 and GHG emissions. As aforementioned in the introduction of this paper, 
China recently overtook the United States of America as the number one contributor of GHG and 
 𝐶𝑂2 emissions. Therefore, it is fundamental to the understanding of feasibility to examine what, 
potentially, enabled this, and if it was policy related. 
 In their INDC, the United States of America makes a commitment of 28% reduction 
from 2005 levels by 2025, 108 compared to that of China’s 60-65% by 2030.  In 2005 emissions 
levels in the USA were 5886317.61 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2. 109 This goal of reduction by 2025 is earlier than 
any other country, and is even set before the assumed peak year for every country, however it is 
at a much lower percentage rate. It is still ambitious, though, and would take a significant 
amount of work by the USA to achieve.  
In order to meet its 2025 INDC commitment of reducing emissions by 28% below 2005 
levels, the United States would have had to implement both the Clean Power Plan and the 
Obama Administration’s full Climate Action Plan110, those of which were recently rescinded by 
President Donald Trump.111 US policies, including the Clean Power Plan, however, would have 
only reduced emissions to 17% below 2005 levels by 2025112, and more policy action and 
acceleration of reductions strategies would have needed to take place.  
                                                                
108 2015. "The United States of America's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions." United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change website. March 30. 
109 (European Comission 2016) Supra. Note 71 
110 U.S. Department of State. 2016. "2016 SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT of the United States of America." United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website: Submitted Biennial Reports from Annex I Parties . 
http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/p
df/2016_second_biennial_report_of_the_united_states_.pdf. 
111 United States Government. 2017. Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth. The White House. 
112 (U.S. Department of State 2016)Supra. Note 110 at 30 
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The USA INDC is no longer ratified as they have pulled out of the Paris Agreement 
under President Donald Trump on June 1, 2017. This does not, however, effect China’s 
commitment, nor the commitments of any of the other 195 countries the world over.  The value 
of comparing the USA’s INDC information to the feasibility of China’s INDC is that it indicates 
China’s INDC goal was in line with targets set by the other most significant contributor of GHG 
and CO2 emissions. It now speaks to the achievability of the goal, in an offside way, because 
China will now be viewed with more scrutiny by the international community since it is the 
largest contributor who is still signed to the Paris Agreement. 
The European Union 
 
 The European Union was selected for comparative analysis because its INDCs 
encompass several countries and economies. It is also a leader in making environmentally 
concerned decisions and enforcing policy that considers environmental impacts. The opinion that 
the European Union sets an example of how to achieve environmental policy ambitions is what 
is most significant to this comparison. The European Union is one of the more influential bodies 
present in United Nations decision making. It is, however, understood that there are few 
similarities to China in the European Union with respect to GDP and it consists mostly of 
developed countries. Nevertheless, this provides a differing perspective with respect to 
understanding feasibility of INDCs by China.  
A significant indication of the ambitiousness of China’s goal for emissions reduction can 
be found in the fact that the whole of the European Union, has made a commitment of 40% 
reduction by 2030 with an index level set to 1990113, as compared to China’s 60-65% of 2005 
levels by the same year. What is significant about this is that 1990 levels were far lower than 
2005 levels, even in the EU countries, though the EU’s 1990 level of emissions were higher than 
China’s at the time114 (see Figure 5 in Appendix).  What this suggests, therefore, is that the EU 
                                                                
113 Latvia and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. 2015. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States. Riga, March 6. 
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf 
114 (Olivier 2016) Supra. Note 61 at 38 
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countries plan to drastically reduce their emissions, nevertheless. In 1990, the EU had emissions 
of 4385704.78 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 , and China had 2293539.57 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 115. With that being said, it 
would have been much more ambitious, and perhaps unrealistic, for China to index to 1990.  
Much of the methodologies and strategies for the EU to achieve their goal have been 
highlighted in their INDC as pending while they wait for submissions from their member states. 
So, it is unclear exactly how the EU plans to achieve this goal as of the writing of this paper. It is 
important to note, however, that the EU has been successful in reducing their emission over the 
period of 1990-2015 to 3469670.82 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 116, which is around 1 million Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 in 25 
years, whereas, China has seen a drastic increase of over 8 million Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 within these same 
25 years. This information is valuable, though, to the understanding of ambitiousness of China’s 
goals. While the EU has set targets of reducing their emissions by roughly 1754281.91 Ktons, 
china has set targets for reduction by roughly 3704829.96 to 4013565.79 Ktons and thus we see 
that China’s goal is significantly more ambitious. 
India 
 
Also, a developing country, and situated in the east Asian geolocation, India is being 
considered for this feasibility study because it shares many similar adverse environmental 
qualities with China. The two countries have large populations, lacking environmental policy 
enforcement, and serious air quality issues. However, with that being said, India only accounts 
for 7% of the total global  𝐶𝑂2 and GHG emissions.
117  It is therefore vital to the understanding 
of feasibility and ambitiousness, of China’s INDC, to examine what has assisted India in 
maintaining such low emissions as compared to China. India’s INDC document is the only other 
INDC in this comparative group that encompasses similar related goals as China’s INDC. The 
other three INDC documents do not contain information about increasing non-fossil fuel energy, 
nor forest stock volume. Therefore, the comparison with India is slightly more significant. 
                                                                
115 (European Comission 2016) Supra. Note 71 
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India has made a commitment to reduce their emissions intensity per their GDP by 33-
35% by 2030 from 2005 level in their INDCs.118 In 2005 India’s emissions were 1270039.97 
Ktons 𝐶𝑂2. 119 India and China are both developing countries and within the top 6 highest global 
emitters of 𝐶𝑂2  emissions
120 (see Figure 6 in Appendix). Even though India is not required to 
submit emissions reduction goals, they have voluntarily submitted a previous goal to the UN of 
reducing their emissions intensity per their GDP by 20–25%, over 2005 levels, by 2020.121  
India has many policies in place at national level to mitigate climate change and 𝐶𝑂2  
emissions, similar to China, and indicate many of the same mechanisms for reduction. Some of 
these are: enhancing energy efficiency in industries, developing climate resilient urban centers, 
developing a safe, smart and sustainable green transportation network, and promoting citizens 
and private sector contributions to climate change.122  India has, so far, successfully seen their 
emission intensity per GDP decrease by 12% between 2005 and 2010.123 This is significant, 
given that they were not obligated by the UN to do so. India seems to be on their way to reaching 
their INDC goal of 33-35% reductions by 2030, therefore. 
While China’s INDC indicates increasing their share of non-fossil fuel energy by around 
20% as a top priority, India is the only other INDC that makes mention it at all. India indicates in 
their INDC document that they want to achieve a 40% capacity from non-fossil fuel based 
energy resources by 2030.124 The most notable achievement for India in terms of their non-fossil 
fuel energy consumption is the installation of 2,970 MW grid-connected solar generation 
capacity.125 Additionally, India has mandated a Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) program for 
                                                                
118 Government of India. 2015. "INDCs as communicated by Parties." United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Website. October 1. 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20
UNFCCC.pdf 
119 (European Comission 2016) Supra. Note 71 
120 (Olivier 2016) Supra. Note 61 at 44 
121 (Government of India 2015) Supra. Note 118 at 8 
122 (Government of India 2015) Supra. Note 118 at 8-18 
123 (Government of India 2015) Supra. Note 118 at 8 
124 (Government of India 2015) Supra. Note 118 at 29 
125 Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change: Government of India. 2014. India’s Progress in 
Combating Climate Change: Briefing Paper for UNFCCC COP 20 Lima, PERU. New Dehli, December. 
http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-releases/Indian_Country_Paper_Low_Res.pdf. 
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the industrial sector126. It is a market based trading scheme that allows trade of energy among 
energy intensive industrial plants and awards Energy Saving Certificates to those who 
overachieve the targets127. It, additionally, mandates a decrease in energy consumption and this 
has led to a reduction of 4 to 5% of energy consumption in 2015 as compared to that in 2012128.  
Similarly, to China’s INDC, India too stipulates a mechanism for afforestation. This 
seems to be an area of particular interest to India as it has seen an increased from 23.4% in 2005 
to 24% of the geographical area in 2013129. India has also specified their long-term goal of 
increasing the forest coverage to 33% of the geographical area in their INDC130. The INDC 
indicates that these results will be possible for india through policies; such as the National Agro-
forestry Policy, the REDD-Plus policy, the Joint Forest Management and through the National 
Afforestation Programme.131 
Given that India’s INDC is so similar, in the sense that it also encompasses additional 
goals and mechanisms, it is significant to compare it to China’s INDC to see if China’s INDC is 
overly ambitious or feasible. India is also a developing country and not required to submit any 
goals to the UNCCC but has clearly achieved many things that it has set out to achieve. This is 
advantageous to informing China’s INDC feasibility because many of the same goals are 
expressed. Knowing, therefore, how India was capable of achieving their goals is worthwhile. 
South Korea 
 
Part of the Asian Pacific alongside China, South Korea can provide a unique perspective 
toward the accomplishment of INDC targets for China. A specific reason for choosing this 
country lays in the fact that both countries are considered emerging economies and share similar 
status as developing countries. It proves significant, that economic advancement is of specific 
concern to these two countries and production and manufacturing is a key element in their 
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129 (Government of India 2015) Supra. Note 118 at 16 
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growth. It is also noteworthy to mention their close proximity to each other, as this may provide 
insight into South Korea’s efforts to curb their global emissions and may influence policy 
decision making by the national government. South Korea is increasingly being viewed globally 
as an environmentally concerned country and has made some significant strides in their 
execution of their environmental policy and therefore serves as an imperative comparison 
interest.  
In comparing the countries and their INDC targets for reduction, we must consider that 
South Korea’s INDC is incredibly relaxed and they are not so straight forward in their 
commitment. What is most significantly different about South Korea’s commitment is that they 
do not index to a specific year, but rather to a “Business-As-Usual (BAU)” level, essentially 
meaning if South Korea were to continue their emissions at their current level. Interestingly they 
commit to reducing their emissions by 37% below the BAU level.132 Later, when explaining that 
their target is fair and ambitious, they indicate another commitment of reducing their total global 
GHG emissions by 40-70% from 2010 levels by 2050.133 Interestingly South Korea suggests that 
they are not able to set more stringent goals because of their industrial structure with roughly a 
32% share of manufacturing.134 Comparing this to China, with roughly a 39.8% share of 
manufacturing135, it seems a bit dull of an excuse. However South Korea’s current emissions 
only amounts to 1.4% of global GHG emissions.136 Their cumulative emissions were 62994.79 
Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 in 2015.
137  
South Korea, being a developing country, is not required to submit reductions goals to the 
UN, but did so at the 2015 UNCCC. This may have a bearing on the slackening of their targets. 
However, it is still significant to compare with China’s INDC as it provides an indication of 
                                                                
132 Republic of Korea. 2015. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Republic%20of%20Korea/1/INDC%
20Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf 
133 (Republic of Korea 2015)Ibid. at 4 
134 (Republic of Korea 2015)Ibid. at 4 
135 United States CIA. 2016. The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2012.html?countryName=China&countryCode=CH&regionCode=eas&#CH 
136 (Republic of Korea 2015) Supra. Note 126 at 4 
137 (European Comission 2016) Supra. Note 71 
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China’s INDC ambition. South Korea’s INDC is obviously far less ambitious than all other 
INDCs examined in this comparative analysis but it supplies the notion that China’s INDC could 
be much less developed and thus much less ambitious, given that it is also a developing country 
that does not need to submit goals to the UN.  
The chosen comparatives all maintained various differences and similarities to China and, 
as expected, they provide a varying degree of value to the understanding of the feasibility and the 
ambitiousness of China’s INDC. Each of these comparatives have submitted INDCs to the Paris 
UNCCC in 2015, whether required to or not, and all have ratified into the Paris Agreement. They 
are at various levels of enforcement of their proposed targets and ambitions, likewise. Therefore, 
the wide range of information available helped to provide a greater understanding of what China 
may be capable of achieving in its own regard.  
Feasibility Study 
 
In conducting this feasibility study, the four main overhead goals were examined for their 
ability to be integrated into policy as well as executed realistically. The feasibility study is based 
on the extensive research, in the critical policy analysis, comparative analysis and literature 
review, on both the current practices, policies and strategies employed by the Chinese 
government and the proposed INDC changes and their impact.  The feasibility study will contain 
extensive data related to political, environmental, economic, and technical impact and will 
include advantages and disadvantages of both the current situation and the proposed policy 
changes. Lastly a brief commentary on the likelihood of achieving the proposed INDC timeline 
of 2030 will be discussed in a schedule feasibility study. Since the paper is framed under the 
SWOT framework, the various feasibilities will be categorized as whether they are a strength, 
weakness, opportunity or threat to achieving China’s INDC goals.   
Political Feasibility 
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The political feasibility of China’s INDC initiated changes is based largely on whether 
the national, provincial and local level governments and officials can support each other and 
come to an agreement on the implementation of the policies in place and the proposed policy 
changes presented. As discussed in previous sections of this report, the three levels of 
government each hold a significant extent of power to enforce the policies and thus their 
individual interests are of importance in terms of whether they are willing to enforce it. To 
reiterate, it is obvious that the national level government interests in implementation of the INDC 
policies, as well as current national policies, is the highest. They are the level of government that 
is introducing the policies and proposed INDC changes, after all. They are also the level of 
government with an international responsibility to the United Nations and are paying 
considerable attention to their international reputation. The provincial level of government has 
been expressing their interest in aligning with the national level government through their 
production and implementation of provincial polices and pilot programs, likewise. However, 
where it gets disorganized and uncertain is at the local level of government. In terms of their 
interest in perpetuation, implementation and support for national and provincial level policies 
and the proposed INDC changes, the appearance from the local level governments has been 
supportive. However, in terms of their history of implementation of this support it has been less 
satisfactory and much of the environmental strides at national and provincial level have been 
given less consideration at local level.  
Not only is the local level of government varied in type but their administrative 
capabilities are varied as well. Below provincial level government the local level government is 
essentially made up of four other administrative levels, these are: Prefectural, County, Township 
and Village levels.138 Furthermore, these four levels break down into various levels of 
administration which have even greater variation in their capabilities.139 A very significant 
challenge for China and implementation of national policy is the alignment of all these levels of 
government to a shared goal. Likewise, uncovering what the interests of each individual 
                                                                
138 The Central People's Government. 2013. Administrative Division of the People's Republic of China. 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content_18253.htm 
139 (The Central People's Government 2013) Ibid. 
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prefecture, county, township or village level government are poses difficulties. However, it can 
be reiterated, from the literature review, that the most likely interest for local level governments 
is that of GDP and economic growth for their constituency.  This leaves climate change policies 
as a secondary, or even perhaps less significant, interest. It should be noted though, that national 
level government, and the provincial level government, can forcefully impose the policies and 
policy actions on the local level government. It is just understood that the higher-level 
governments afford the curtesy of allowing the local level governments to make their own 
decisions for their communities.  
As reiterated from the methodology and framework section of this paper, current national 
level policies, such as the 12th and 13th 5-year plans and the NCCP are advantageous because 
they outline specifics of how to begin the implementation of successful policy actions. They also 
contain the explanations of the necessary framework for the implementation of the various policy 
mechanisms for achieving similar goals to the INDC overhead goals, those of which can easily 
be changed to reflect the new INDC goals. However, the national policies have their 
disadvantages as well. One such disadvantage is that there is not a clear legislative system for 
implementation of these policies. As demonstrated in the critical policy analysis, all the national 
policies outline mechanisms to achieve their goals, but there is not a clear policy currently in 
China that says exactly how they are to be executed at ground level and much of the wording in 
the current policies are simply suggestive. The policies, likewise, do not stipulate penalties or 
repercussions for not implementing them and they are written more as policy guiding principles, 
for policy making, rather than policy actions.  
Similarly, the changes proposed in the INDC document are advantageous because they 
increase the percentages of emissions reduction and specify many specific mechanisms 
additional to those in the current policies. The INDC document has also been ratified into the 
Paris Agreement in 2016 at the international level, which carries with it a certain amount of 
accountability. The overhead goals are easily transferable to current policies in China and are 
aligned with the current national interests which makes it easy to adopt into national policy. 
However, there is still the disadvantage of these policy changes not carrying any repercussions 
Is Clean Air Possible? A Critical Analysis of China’s 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions for 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
2015. | Submitted by: Amanda Turner [Supervisor 
Qiang Zha] 
Page 46 of  77 
 
and being more like guiding principles than policy actions. Because they are more ambitious 
with their overhead goals, the INDC could also be considered a disadvantage because it would 
require much more work at all levels of government.  
The ability to change the current national policy, or adopting the INDC goals and 
mechanisms into national policy is, in fact, feasible. Likewise, adopting the INDC goals and 
mechanisms is already taking place at national level in the 13th 5-year plan. When the goals and 
mechanisms are adopted into current national policy, it is politically feasible to assume that the 
provincial level of government will include the new goals and mechanisms into their own current 
policy, considering their alignment with the national level government. The only area in which 
these goals and mechanisms are potentially not politically feasible are at the local level for 
reasons specified prior in this section.   
In terms of the implementation of these policies, politically, at least in terms of 
reputation, there is no issue at national or provincial level. Both national and provincial 
governments have a reputation for and have been recognized by the public as being supportive 
towards and promoting environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation for the 
country. Therefore, if the national government were to begin ratifying national policies that 
included strict measures and repercussions of inaction, it does not seem likely that there would 
be disagreement. Reiterated from the critical analysis, the targets and goals as they pertain to 
emissions reduction, forest cover and non-fossil fuel energy source increase of the 12th 5-year 
plan were achieved. This indicates that perhaps it is feasible to implement the necessary policy 
actions needed to achieve the INDC policy changes and mechanisms.  
Political feasibility is considered an area of strength in terms of reaching the INDC goals, 
regardless of the disconnect between local and national government. This is largely due to the 
fact that China maintains a very strong communist national government. This power at national 
level can allow for the implementation of the INDC mechanisms if the policy forums are 
changed and subsequently enforced by the governing bodies.  
Environmental Feasibility 
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China has set some very ambitious overhead goals in terms of their environmental 
impacts, and their feasibility is questionable. However, given that China has seen success with 
somewhat lower goals set, it is not incredibly unlikely that they could reach these goals, and 
achieve environmental feasibility, likewise.  
Two main INDC overhead goals will be the defining factors in whether, or not, this 
policy is environmentally feasible; increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in the energy mix by 
20%, and increasing the forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic meters.  Increasing forest 
carbon stocks by this amount infers an increase in forest cover of 50-100 million hectares of 
forest.140 This increase would create a nearly 1-gigaton carbon sink, equivalent to stopping 
tropical deforestation for almost a full year, or taking 770 million cars off the road.141 This alone 
could see that the overhead goal of reducing emissions by 60-65% does indeed happen, if not 
increase that percentage. However, planting these many trees will take up a lot of land, and 
additionally the trees will take time to grow to maturity and maintain the ability to fully sequester 
the 𝐶𝑂2 it needs to. Another main thing to consider in terms of the feasibility of this endeavor is 
that China was only able to increase its tree cover by 49 million hectares over 20 years, from 
1990 to 2010.142  
However, the potential for 𝐶𝑂2 reduction is significantly increased when forest cover 
increase is coupled with the proposed INDC overhead goal of increasing the share of non-fossil 
fuel energy, and consequently a significant reduction in coal use.  To reach the overhead goal of 
20% increase in non-fossil fuel energy will require China to deploy 800 to 1,000 gigawatts in 
non-fossil capacity.143 According to studies done by the National center for Climate Change 
Strategy in China, the share of all renewables in total power generation is expected to rise to 30% 
in 2030.144  Likewise, China’s installed capacity of non-fossil power is expected to increase by 
                                                                
140 Taryn Fransen, Ranping Song, Fred Stolle and Geoffrey Henderson. 2015. A Closer Look at China's New 
Climate Plan (INDC). Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
141 (Taryn Fransen 2015) Ibid. 
142 (Taryn Fransen 2015) Ibid. 
143 (Taryn Fransen 2015) Ibid. 
144 National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation. 2016. Pursuing an Innovative 
Development Pathwa: Understanding China's NDC. Partnership for Market Readiness. 
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over 900 gigawatts from 2014 levels.145 Demonstrated in Figure 10, in the appendices, average 
annual installation of non- fossil capacity should, and could, increase from around 42 gigawatts 
per year in the period from 2005- 2020 to 66 gigawatts during 2020 - 2030, and to potentially 87 
gigawatts in the 2030- 2050 period.146 The share of non-fossil fuels is projected to increase from 
7.9% in 2010 to 22% by 2030.147 Due to the increase in non-fossil fuels, the share of coal use is 
projected to decrease from 71% in 2010 to 50% in 2030.148 Additionally, the mix of mitigation 
efforts across different areas proposes a carbon-mitigation potential of 850000 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 in 
2020, 2300000 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 in 2030, and 5400000 Ktons 𝐶𝑂2 in 2050.
149  
In deciding the environmental feasibility, the overall UN Paris Agreement target of 
limiting the global temperature rise to below 1.5°C must also be taken into consideration. 
China’s INDC overhead goals were, in fact, created to contribute environmentally to this target. 
Even if China can meet their INDC goals and make significant reductions, their efforts alone will 
not be sufficient to limit the global temperature from rising below 1.5°C. However, with 
combined efforts of the other parties signed to the Paris Agreement, China’s goals are ambitious 
and accommodating. In terms of overall environmental feasibility, it seems feasible that China 
can reach their INDC goals. It is not environmentally feasible for the Paris Agreement target, 
alone.  
Environmental feasibility is considered an area of weakness in terms of achieving the 
INDC goals, as well as the Paris Agreement goals, because it is reliant on all the INDC goals 
being achieved all at once to be significant. Environmental achievement for China is weak unless 
many mechanisms are enforced and many outlying factors are achieved.  
Technological Feasibility 
 
                                                                
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25749/110555-WP-FINAL-PMR-China-
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145 (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation 2016)Supra. Note 144 at 23 
146 (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation 2016)Supra. Note 144 at 25 
147 (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation 2016)Supra. Note 144 at 23 
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First discussed briefly in the literature review, China is participating in various 
international technology transfer programs. These programs include, but are not limited to the 
implementation of supercritical and ultra‐ supercritical coal fired power plants, 
Natural gas combined cycle power plants, Photovoltaic power generation, Wind power, and 
waste heat recovery for steel and cement plants.150 The two main methods for the transfer of 
these technologies are technology licencing and joint ventures.151 
Current policies such as the 12th 5-year plan, and the NCCP do make mention to the need 
for research and development in regard to technological advancement of wind, solar, and other 
forms of renewable or non-fossil fuel energies but do not specify any methods or means in which 
to undertake these efforts. The 12th 5-year plan speaks briefly also of the national government’s 
ambition to construct high-speed rail and make improvements in subway and light rail coverage 
but again is unspecific of whether or not it will be part of a technology transfer or researched and 
developed locally.152 
China’s INDC discusses technology in a specific policy mechanism, suggesting that there 
is a need to enhance support for science and technology through research and development, 
assumingly locally. The mechanism emphasizes the need for strengthening commercialization of 
low-carbon technologies, renewable energies, advanced nuclear power technologies and carbon 
capture and storage.153  It also suggests the promotion of technologies that utilize carbon dioxide 
to enhance oil recovery and coal-bed methane recovery.154 Lastly the INDC mechanism 
highlights the need to improve the technical support system for addressing climate change, by 
establishing a mechanism that effectively integrates government, industries, academic and 
                                                                
150 (Ueno 2009) Supra. Note 57 at 8 
151 (Ueno 2009) Supra. Note 57 at 3 
152 (Lewis 2011)Supra. Note 83 at 3 
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research institutes, as well as, strengthening professional and personnel training for addressing 
climate change.155  
Additionally, stipulated in the INDC document is a section regarding the Paris 
Agreement’s commitment to the continuation and enhancement of these programs. The 
agreement stipulates that developed countries must continue the transfer of technologies to 
developing countries, as well as provide support to their research and development of 
technologies based on need.156 It also stipulates that existing technology mechanisms are to be 
strengthened to address performance and financial mechanisms are to be enhanced to include an 
additional window for technology development and transfer.157 What this means is that the 
ratification of the Paris Agreement by China, and all other countries, and China’s contribution to 
it allow China access to the enhanced technology transfer programs.  
Current national policy has had the advantage of seeing major advances in developing 
efficient coal-burning power generation technologies, and clean coal power generation 
technologies.158 Additionally, energy efficient and saving technologies have been widely 
executed as to be used in building materials and chemicals, and in sectors such as construction, 
transportation, and mining..159 The current policies have seen the advancement of research and 
development in areas such as renewable and new energies like wind, bio-energy, solar, hydro, 
and thermal power technologies.160 
In terms of feasibility, therefore, it can be assumed that with current technology transfer 
programs, the additional availability of support and programs through the Paris Agreement, 
current national policy and INDC policy changes, the technological ability to mitigate climate 
change is feasible. Furthermore, the implementation of the INDC mechanism is also feasible. 
                                                                
155 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
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156 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
70 at 18 
157 (Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commision of China 2015) Supra. Note 
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158 (Ministry of Science and Technology : China 2007) Supra. Note 55 at 3 
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The impact of implementing the INDC policy changes is positive and only adds to the current 
situation for research and development. Implementing the use of the technology advancements 
through these policy changes can aid in reaching the INDC overhead goals, likewise.  
Technological feasibility is considered an area of opportunity for achieving the INDC 
goals, as advancement in technology has the potential to greatly enhance mechanisms for 
achievement and reducing the difficulty in obtaining emissions reduction. Technological 
advances also provide opportunity to the goal of increasing non-fossil fuel energy. 
Economic Feasibility 
 
As highlighted in the literature review, the annual growth (GDP) target in the 12th Five-
Year Plan was 7% and the growth (GDP) target in the 13th Five-Year Plan is 6.5%.161 Therefore, 
China clearly has specific interests in continuing their growth in GDP. However, the 
implementation of China's INDC could promote economic decoupling from carbon emissions, in 
general.162 This means that China’s GDP will be less dependent on carbon, as it is now, and it 
will create a more positive condition for a potential transition toward a low-carbon path of 
development.163 The most significant reason for decoupling will be the decrease in energy 
intensity per unit of GDP, as specified in the INDC, and the increase of non-fossil fuels in 
China’s energy mix.164 
Whether, or not, GDP will take precedent over the efforts of climate change mitigation 
and emissions reduction will largely depend on how China plans to fund their proposed policy 
efforts.  In 2013 China’s was funding their climate efforts through both domestic and foreign 
sources, 1. Public finance which came from both international and domestic sources, 2. Carbon 
market finance through the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); an 
international source, 3. Mainstream private sector finance; such as foreign and domestic bank 
                                                                
161 (World Bank Group 2017) Supra. Note 7 
162 Fu Sha, Zou Ji, Liu Linwei. 2015. An Analysis of China’s INDC. Translated by China Carbon Forum: China 
National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation. 
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163 (Fu Sha 2015)Ibid. at 4 
164 (Fu Sha 2015)Ibid. at 4 
Is Clean Air Possible? A Critical Analysis of China’s 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions for 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
2015. | Submitted by: Amanda Turner [Supervisor 
Qiang Zha] 
Page 52 of  77 
 
loans, 4. Direct investment; again, both foreign and domestic and Charitable and NGO 
financing.165 For a detailed illustration of how these sources stream their distribution of funds to 
China, see Figure 9 in the Appendices.  
 Data available for 2011 suggests that while China does receive much of its climate 
change mitigation and emissions reduction financing from international sources, their domestic 
financing is the most dominant source of funding.166 The most significant source of financing in 
2011 was through private State Banks; totaling US$294 billion167 (See Figure 8 in Appendices). 
In comparison, the total amount of foreign financing in 2011 was US$70.5 billion.168 The UN led 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has, however, been a significant source of low carbon 
financing, with an estimated US$9.3 billion being sourced to China by 2012.169 It is important to 
note that since these numbers were made available, many things have changed in terms of 
economic relationships in China. First, China has begun to fund climate financing for poorer 
developing countries.170 Furthermore, China’s relationships, with the developed countries who 
have been funding them, have shifted toward a more strategic partnership than a relationship 
between donor and recipient and international banks are also increasing their funding.171   
Interestingly, most climate financing in China is focused on mitigation activities. This is 
in alignment with the policies, since none of the policies make any direct mention to adaptation 
strategies. The 12th 5-year plan highlights the need for financial investment toward clean 
technology, energy efficiency, environmental protection and renewable energy.172 This could be 
in a large part because investment from private and public financial sources has been places 
where the returns will be the greatest. Though transportation and building energy conservation 
                                                                
165 The Climate Group. 2013. Shaping China's Climate Finance Policy:. London, UK: The Climate Group. 
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are key issues for all the current and INDC policies, there has been less investment into these 
areas because they simply have higher upfront costs.173 
China’s climate financing is still rather under-developed. This is largely due to the fact 
that administration between government departments is blurred and often duplications and 
ineffective uses of funding results.174 Additionally, there is a deficiency in the regulatory 
standards for financial institutions, as well as a deficiency in statistical information as it pertains 
to climate finance streams, which makes it difficult to manage, account for, or distribute 
international climate funds.175 Additionally, as mentioned previously in political feasibility, 
China’s policies are deficient in legal standing and force. This is necessary to guarantee financial 
institutions are putting their money into feasible endeavors.  
International funding is also changing, which could affect the way and costs in which 
China will have the capability to finance their climate change policy. Revenue from the UN’s 
CDM is declining due to a collapse in the price of CDM credits and increasing restrictions in the 
EU on where credits can be sourced from.176 Regardless of this however, China’s INDC contains 
a specific mention toward the Paris Agreement. It stipulates that developed countries will be 
responsible for new, additional, adequate, sustained and predictable financial support to 
developed countries for their actions against climate change.177 It further outlines that the scale 
of financing will increase yearly from 2020 and will primarily come from public funds.178  The 
INDC speaks specifically about the role of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an important 
operating entity and that it should be strengthened, as well as guided by the parties of the 
convention.179 This means that using the GCF as a negotiation point, China may be able to secure 
additional funding in the future to fuel its policy needs.  
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In terms of the feasibility, therefore, of the current and new policy, there seems to be a lot 
of funding going into the projects resulting from them. Theoretically, yes, it is economically 
feasible to implement policies and policy actions of the INDC because of this. It is especially 
true if the financing from international sources is increased because of the Paris Agreement.  
Economic feasibility is considered an area of threat to the achievement of INDC goals 
because of its hindering ability. Being that GDP growth is such a significant factor at play in 
terms of enforcement of environmental policy by local governments and other actors, it can be 
said that economics threatens that enforcement if conditions are not favorable. With the 
beginning of an economic downturn for China overall, it can be assumed that this treat may 
become very significant in the hindrance of achieving goals set out in the INDC. 
Schedule Feasibility 
 
The schedule for the four INDC overhead goals to be achieved is by 2030. The first thing 
to consider, when deciding if this is feasible, is that of previous overhead goals. The 11th 5-year 
plan specified a timeline from 2005 to 2010, and seen a reduction in emission of 19.1%, just shy 
of their 20% goal in five years.180This also means that the NCCP goal of 20% reductions by 2010 
was also met. The 12th 5-year plan set a timeline from 2011- 2015, and a goal of 16% reduction 
in energy intensity or energy consumption per unit of GDP and 17% reduction in carbon 
intensity or carbon emissions per GDP are cited181, and China was able to achieve an 18.2% 
reduction in energy intensity and 20% reduction in carbon intensity by 2015.182 These are much 
shorter time frames than the INDC goal of 60-65% reduction by 2030, however they are also 
much smaller amounts. 
Given, though, that China has realistically reached around a 20% reduction in five-year 
periods without intense goals and international pressure through the ratification of the INDCs 
into the Paris Agreement, it does not seem to be too farfetched a possibility. Additionally, as 
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demonstrated in the Environmental Feasibility study, the other two targets seem to also be 
achievable, if not even earlier than the INDC proposes.  Therefore, considering all other 
feasibility data, the critical policy analysis and the literature review information, it can be 
assumed that, yes, the schedule for the INDC overhead goals is feasible.  
Schedule feasibility is considered an area of threat to achieving the INDC goals because 
it is a challenge to maintain the trajectory needed to achieve the goals in the set time frame. It is 
not a significant threat, however, as it has been found to be feasible if China adheres to strict 
enforcement of their mechanisms for achieving the INDC goals.  
Enforceability Study 
 
Regardless of whether any of the INDC goals are feasible, the defining factor in the goals 
achievement is whether they are enforced. As previously mentioned in this paper, none of the 
policies, current or proposed by the INDC changes, are subject to repercussions and they are not 
part of any defined legislative system. It is, largely, this reason that enforcement of these INDC 
goals, and even current policy, is sparse and uneven across the various levels of government, as 
well as across the various sectors of business. Information about the implementation mechanisms 
and enforcement of any of the policies discussed in this paper have proven to be nearly 
impossible to uncover, since there is currently very little accountability attached to them.  
However, a journalist, with interest into the enforcement of environmental policy, was 
able to shed light on the fact that, at ground level, a lot of blind eyes are turned toward the 
situation of enforcement. In the documentary ‘Under the Dome,’ by Chai Jing, examples of 
where policy simply did not matter are abundant. There are two examples; industrial 
manufacturing and transportation, that are relevant to the likelihood of enforcement of the 
current policy and the INDC proposed changes in this documentary that will be discussed here.  
Both are largely relevant to the overhead goal of 60-65% reduction in 𝐶𝑂2.  
The first area that Chai Jing uncovers blatant disregard for current policy is related to 
industrial manufacturing. This is particularly related to the first mechanism in the INDC; 
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Building Energy Efficient and Low-Carbon Industrial System, under the overhead goal of 𝐶𝑂2 
reduction. Chai discovers that many regulations are simply not followed in this sector. Upon 
visiting a steel production factory in Hebei province in October 2014, Chai discovers that there 
are completely unsafe working conditions, no ventilation inside of open pit coal burning, and no 
discipline to the factories that operate this way.183 Since they are so poorly managed inside it is 
not hard to believe that steel factories are not managing their emissions. Steel production in 
China requires 600kg of coal and 3-6tons of water to produce 1 ton of steel. This production 
process emits 1.53kg of sulfur dioxide, a significant GHG, and 1kg of soot per 1 ton of steel.184 
The numbers are not given for how much carbon is emitted per 600kg of coal, but it is likely a 
significant amount. It would cost China 100 yuan per ton of steel to bring factories up to MEP 
standards.185 However, when Chai questions the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
about why factories remain unregulated in their emissions, she is simply told that “factories are 
too big to fail”.186 What this means is that the economy is reliant on them, people’s livelihoods 
depend on the jobs in this sector, and the MEP would rather turn a blind eye than risk disrupting 
this system.  
The second area that blatant disregard for policy is uncovered is in the transportation 
sector. The number one pollutant and emitter of 𝐶𝑂2 in Beijing, the country’s capital, are 
vehicles. It can, therefore, be assumed that this is also true for the rest of the country. Not only 
has the country seen a massive spike in the number of vehicles sold and on the road since 1990, 
but the current public transportation system and alternative means of transportation are severely 
lacking.187 The roadway and highway structure is also unsuitable for emission reduction 
capabilities, due to the high idle time for running vehicles as they sit in traffic waiting to move in 
the congestion.188  This situation might be why China thought it necessary to include 
                                                                
183 2015. 穹顶之下 (Under the Dome). Directed by Chai Jing. Performed by Chai Jing. 
http://www.upworthy.com/see-it-here-exclusive-english-translation-of-powerful-viral-chinese-
documentary-under-the-dome 
184 (Chai 2015)Ibid.  
185 (Chai 2015)Ibid. 
186 (Chai 2015)Ibid.  
187 (Chai 2015)Ibid.  
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transportation as an INDC mechanism for the reduction of CO; Controlling Emissions from 
Building and Transportation Sectors.189 
 However, even if the government can improve road structure and limit the number of 
cars on the road, a huge problem remains in the enforcement of regulations for vehicle 
emissions. Chai uncovered that the regulation for filters on 18 wheelers to prevent 500 times 
more carbon emissions, has been completely disregarded. As an investigative journalist, Chai 
accompanied police as they inspected 18 wheelers heading into the city in the middle of the night 
carrying various goods. The trucks had the stickers that proved certified for approved emissions 
filtering but an alarming number of the trucks with these stickers did not actually have the filter 
on the vehicle.190 When Chai inquired further to the manufacturer who is in control of issuing the 
stickers, they dismiss her complaint as simply a mistake in placing stickers and that if the order is 
there for the trucks they will sell them.191 She also questions the ministries for not enforcing this 
rule and she does not ever get an answer.192 In the process of uncovering this, Chai also 
criticizes PetroChina and Sinopec for distributing poor quality oil to vehicles in China, which 
results in increased GHG emissions. These companies set their own production standards and 
the MEP is again claiming powerless to respond.193 What seemed to be happening, therefore, is 
that no one wants to take responsibility for changing the rules. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection is a newer ministry who, at the time, seemed fearful to begin enforcement and disrupt 
the current system. 
In recent years, as the Chinese Government has become increasingly more aware of the 
ever-accumulating environmental problems facing China, they have also become more aware of 
the fact that enforcement of environmental laws and regulations has been slack. In April 2014, 
the National Government imposed changes to the country’s Environmental Protection Law 
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(EPL), and have begun the attempt implementation of it as of January 2015194. These changes are 
the first changes to the EPL since its inception in the 1980s195. It is being touted as the strictest 
piece of legislation regarding the environment in China in the Ministry of Environment’s 
history196.  The new EPL has an expressed focus on correcting the issue of weak enforcement, 
particularly in the areas of imposing greater liability on enterprise, providing repercussions for 
violations of regulations and policy, and establishing a forum for environmental public-interest 
litigation197. Accordingly, the national government has proposed intensification of supervision as 
a means to monitor the enforcement of this new legislation.  
Regarding the imposition of greater liability on enterprises, Section 1 of Article 19 in the 
EPL extends the scope of projects required to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA).198 Additionally, a stipulation in Article 56 specifies that the enterprise in charge of 
conducting an EIA must also engage in public consultation199. This requires them to explain the 
project to the public and fully solicit their opinions. The department responsible for approving 
the EIA report must publish the full text of such report200. Additionally, Article 45 stipulates that 
all enterprises that may emit GHG or 𝐶𝑂2, must apply for a license to do so, and must observe 
the requirements of the license201. Currently, the Ministry is establishing the integrated Pollution 
Administrative Permit System (PAPS), and has recommended that the State Council formulate 
implementation regulations202.  Additionally, Article 64 states that those who have caused 
environmental damages from pollution shall be subject to tort liability in accordance with the 
provisions of the Tort Liability Law of the People's Republic of China203. 
                                                                
194 King & Wood Mallesons. 2014. Environmental Protection Law: Big Changes in 2014. May 20. Accessed July 
2017. http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2014/05/articles/compliance/environmental-protection-law-big-
changes-in-2014-2/. 
195 (King & Wood Mallesons 2014) Ibid. 
196 (King & Wood Mallesons 2014) Ibid. 
197 (King & Wood Mallesons 2014) Ibid. 
198 2014. "EU-China Environmental Governance Programme." Environmental Protection Law of The People's 
Republic of China- unofficial translation. EU-China Environmental Governance Programme, April 24. 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law-2014-eversion.pdf. 
199 (EU-China Environmental Governance Programme 2014) Ibid. at 12 
200 (EU-China Environmental Governance Programme 2014) Ibid. at 12 
201 (EU-China Environmental Governance Programme 2014) Supra. Note 198 at 9 
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The identified repercussions for violations are significant in the revised EPL. Section 2 of 
Article 19 has imposed strict repercussions on projects that do not provide the necessary EIA to 
the extent of disallowing the project to commence204. Article 61 further identifies repercussions 
for failure to produce an EIA if the project is already underway, such as being ordered to be 
suspended the project, having to pay a fine, or in extreme cases, being ordered to restore the site 
to its original condition205.  
Moreover, Article 55 provides that with respect to the enterprises whom illegally 
discharged pollutants, the Ministry may seize and detain facilities and equipment that discharge 
said pollutants206. Article 59 Section 1 stipulates that where an enterprise is subject to a fine, for 
violations, and is ordered to rectify the situations that contribute to illegal emissions, but refuses 
to do so, the Ministry may impose consecutive daily fines based on the original penalty amount, 
starting from the day following the order of rectification207. Section 2 further orders that the 
amount for the penalty shall be determined in accordance with the operational costs of pollution 
prevention, direct losses caused by the illegal act, illegal gains and other similar factors208. This 
fining scheme is unlimited and could result in crippling the project financially, consequently.  
Perhaps the most substantial change in terms of repercussions is the fact that those in 
charge of the enterprise can be held accountable and serve detention for a period between 5 days 
and 15 days for severe violations209. Article 63 lays out the groundwork in which this can 
happen. Expressly, Section 1 to 4 detail that violations in which a penalty has been applied, but is 
refused to have been carried out are subject to this more severe penalty.210  
With respect to intensification of supervision and monitoring, Article 42, Section 2 
requires that any institution or enterprise that has potential to emit pollution must establish an 
Environmental Protection Accountability System (EPAS) which also specifies the 
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responsibilities of any person(s) in charge of this endeavor211. Substantially emitting enterprises 
shall install monitoring equipment which must be operated at a normal rate, and usage must be 
ensured. Additionally, the person(s) responsible for maintaining this equipment must keep the 
original records of said monitoring212. Having a permit system, as defined in Article 45, also 
allows for the Ministry to monitor who has the legal right to emit GHG and 𝐶𝑂2 and provides 
room to crack down on violations. Article 54, Section 2 creates accountability to the public. It 
states that when a violation has happened, the Ministry shall record the list of the enterprise’s 
violations into the public record in a timely fashion.213 Any respectful enterprise that is 
concerned with their reputation would be hard pressed to want this information to be made 
public. 
 Furthermore, by creating a forum for environmental public-interest litigation, 
accountability is greatly increased. As with many sections of China’s INDC, an emphasis on 
public involvement is stressed in the new Environmental Protection Law. Article 57 Section 1 
explains that the public is encouraged to carry out supervision on environmental violations. 
Specifically, citizens, legal persons and other organizations that discover environmental pollution 
and ecological destruction by any organization or individual are entitled to report such violations 
to the Ministry214. Article 57 Section 2 increases the accountability to, and power of, the public 
further by stipulating that where the Ministry fails to perform its responsibilities, citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations are entitled to report such non-performance to their superior 
authorities or the supervision authorities, respectively.215  
The most meaningful change pertaining to public-interest litigation is that found in 
Article 58, which establishes the conditions for public-interest lawsuits. With respect to actions 
that pollute the environment and harm the public interest, competent social organization may 
bring a lawsuit to the court216. It is important to note, however, that it is specified in Article 58 
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that not just any publicly interested organization can bring a lawsuit. Only social organizations 
that meet the following conditions, as stipulated in the EPL, consecutive years or more, and have 
no law violation records.  may file litigation to the people's courts; Those organizations who 
have been registered at the civil affair departments of people’s governments at or above 
municipal level with sub-districts in accordance with the law and those organizations who have 
specialized in environmental protection public interest activities for five consecutive years or 
more, and have not violated the law themselves.217. Regardless of the tight constraints on who 
can bring the lawsuit, it is significant to note that public interest groups are able to make a legal 
claim to the violations by enterprise if they see it is needed, allowing for much greater public 
involvement. 
The government in China and its Ministries hold the most significant power for the 
ability to enforce its legislations, policies and regulations. The Environmental Protection Law is 
significant in providing the Ministry of Environment with the enforcement power it needs and 
evidently the Ministry has subsequently begun the steps needed in the implementation of the 
policies and regulations it champions.  However, it is important to consider that enforcement of 
the policies, regulations and legislation available to China will require Ministry accountability 
and intense monitoring to be successful. The local bodies responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement have followed varying methods of achieving this, thus far, and as mentioned in 
other sections of this paper the degree in which environmental monitoring and enforcement have 
been understood as significant also varies.    
While the laws have been made stricter, they did in fact exist before these changes and as 
shown by Chai in her investigations, it is easy enough for the Ministry to pass on the 
responsibility by ignoring the violation as it sees fit. Therefore, it will also require ground level 
participation and consistency, something that has a proven track record of being slack. Perhaps 
the rise of, and promotion of, public participation is right to be so greatly indicated. Unless the 
enforcement at ground level improves drastically from these legislative changes, nothing will 
truly change for China’s emissions, and no significant reductions will take place. All the 
                                                                
217 (EU-China Environmental Governance Programme 2014) Supra. Note 198 at 13 
Is Clean Air Possible? A Critical Analysis of China’s 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions for 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
2015. | Submitted by: Amanda Turner [Supervisor 
Qiang Zha] 
Page 62 of  77 
 
companies and people Chai interviewed and spoke with during her documentary indicated that 
they would, indeed, follow the rules if the rules were being enforced. Chai also cites that if China 
could properly enforce existing standards in the industrial manufacturing and transportation 
sectors alone, there would be a roughly 60% reduction in GHG emissions218, but business as 
usual conditions will simply not see this through.219  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The actuality that climate change is such a significant and pressing issue, and the fact that 
China is a leading contributor to the issue, indicates that it is significantly important that China’s 
contribution to the global effort of climate change mitigation be investigated and evaluated for its 
merit. Therefore, the most recent contributions to the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (UNCCC) in December 2015, by means of China’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDC), are vital to the understanding of the future impact China may have on the 
problem.  In other words, it is important to the understanding of the global issue to know if 
China’s INDC will have a significant impact on lowering emissions domestically, which will 
subsequently lower the emissions globally. And since China has Ratified their INDC into the UN 
Paris Agreement in 2016 it is significant to determine if the INDC holds water to the greater 
effort.  
China’s INDC has been subjected, herein, to a critical policy analysis, a brief comparison 
analysis, and a feasibility study, in an attempt to answer the question of whether the targets set 
out in China’s INDCs at the UNCCC in 2015 feasible within their proposed timeframe goal of 
2030. These three examinations have revealed whether the INDC will have any effect on both 
policy making in China and on the reduction of emissions. Additionally, they have revealed an 
existing paradigm surrounding China’s enforceability of their environmental policies. All the 
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examinations, and their findings, were based on extensive research into topic matter; such as 
current and past climate change or environmental policies, strategies, practices, technologies and 
economics, and through numerous sources; such as governmental data, UN and World Bank 
data, academic journals and reports, books, and a video documentary. 
Findings 
 
China has made themselves globally accountable by outlining, in their INDC, four 
specific goals that they would like to achieve through a number of mechanisms, also detailed 
therein. Their INDC goals are ambitious but not unlike those of the four comparison countries. 
They are more detailed and ambitious than South Korea and the American INDCs, but potential 
even or maybe slightly less ambitious than the INDC goals of the European Union and India.  
China has several national and provincial policy pieces in place that facilitate their global 
climate change goals and can be adapted to include the INDC policy changes. They also have 
many strategies and practices that are outlined in their current policies for achieving climate 
change mitigation actions. Politically, however, there is a disconnect from national and 
provincial to local implementation of these policies due to the local need to invest in economic 
growth. 
 Economically China is growing but is beginning to see a slight decline in GDP, the 
funding for environmental policy enactment comes largely from domestic sources, which are 
tied, therefore, to GDP and in order to maintain the funding needed, let alone increase it, 
international sources may need to be increasingly relied on. Additionally, there is funding for 
technological initiatives from the global level.  
Technologically, China has a structure in place that allows them to participate in research 
and development in new technologies for climate change emissions mitigation. They are active 
participants in the global effort of technology transfers which benefits them and helps make 
technological advancement in this area affluent. 
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 Environmentally China is already on track to see their INDC goal of peaking carbon 
emissions early, and given their recent achievements in their 12th 5-year plan it is likely that they 
could achieve their carbon emissions reduction targets if they are able to increase the forest cover 
and the percentage of non-fossil fuel energy sources. This, however does not mean that China’s 
contributions alone will achieve the Paris Agreement goal of limiting the global temperature rise 
by 1.5 degree.  
In examining the schedule, all four of the goals are easily obtained within their set target 
timeframe if their specific mechanisms are achieved. China has been achieving their previously 
set goals in the 12th 5-year plan so the timeframe, though a little steeper in comparison, is not 
unrealistic. 
While theoretically all the examined facets are feasible for China’s INDC goals, it was 
significant to the likelihood of achievement to consider domestic enforcement. Enforcement 
records of environmental policies, regulations and legislation are spotty, at best, and it proved 
rather difficult to find data on them. This could be partly due to the fact that the regulations, 
policies and legislation are vast, expand across too many sectors, and are governed by varying 
ministries, or governmental bodies at local level and, because of unstable methods for 
monitoring, they are hard to keep track of.  
It was found that, at the local level in various capacities, regulations are absolutely 
ignored or easily avoided. This constitutes a real issue in the ability of the national government 
to realize its goals for emissions reduction. This alongside the political agenda that sees local 
level governments not implementing environmental policies indicates that there is a significant 
disconnect between feasibility and enforcement.  
The recent changes made to one legislative piece, the Environmental Protection Law, 
were intended to increase the enforceability and monitoring power of the Ministry of 
Environment, as well as afford greater public involvement capabilities, in an attempt to satisfy 
the problems in this area. However, ground level investigations into enforcement have revealed a 
paradigm that indicates how easy it is for the Ministry to simply not take responsibility for 
enforcing the laws, even when they have the power to. This leaves a reasonable doubt for the 
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ability of the national government to achieve the INDC goals and questions feasibility overall, 
therefore.   
Limitations 
 
This paper does not have the capacity to give complete and comprehensive consideration 
to all aspects pertaining to China’s INDC, and therefore is prepared to accept its limitations. The 
paper is limited to the resources it has included in its consideration, and additional information 
could elaborate further in the feasibility studies. These limitations, furthermore, include the need 
for future research to be done on the implementation of China’s INDC policy changes and 
additionally, revisiting the outcome of the newly instituted legislative changes to the 
Environmental Protection Law as this paper cannot predict the future, and can only be accepted 
that its findings are assumed based on China’s past practices, strategies and policy actions. 
Therefore, the achievements by China on their INDC policy changes will need to be monitored. 
Additionally, enforcement of the regulations and policies that result from INDC changes plays 
the most significant role. However, this area of research was only limitedly covered in this paper 
and so there is a need for deeper consideration of this and future research should be done 
regarding this paradigm.  
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Figure 1: Relative Pros and Cons of Different Market-Based Policies. [ Source: (Moarif and Rastogi 2012)pp. 3]  
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Figure 2: Average Ratio of Days Reaching Decent quality air conditions. [ Source: (Wu, et al. 2013) pp. 36] 
 
Figure 3: Comparing days of good air quality and the influence of environmental infrastructure improvements. [ Source: (Wu, et 
al. 2013)pp. 37] 
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Figure 4: Types of GHG Inventory Methods. [ Source:  (Gu, Li and Cook 2014)pp. 2] 
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Figure 5: CO2 Emissions per Country from Fossil-fuel use and cement production. [ Source: (Olivier 2016) pp. 38] 
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Figure 6: CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel use and cement production in the top 5 emitting countries and the EU. [ Source: (Olivier 
2016) pp. 44] 
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Figure 7: CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2013, by sector and fuel, in China, the United States, the European Union 
and India [ Source: (IEA, 2015c) in (Olivier 2016) pp. 36] 
 
Is Clean Air Possible? A Critical Analysis of China’s 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions for 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
2015. | Submitted by: Amanda Turner [Supervisor 
Qiang Zha] 
Page 72 of  77 
 
 
Figure 8: sources and Scales of Climate Financing in China [ Source: (The Climate Group 2013) pp. 2] 
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Figure 9: Climate Finance Sources and Flows in China. [ Source: (The Climate Group 2013) pp. 3] 
 
Figure 10:The Deployment of Non-Fossil Fuel Energy 2005-2050. [ Source: (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and 
International Cooperation 2016) pp. 25] 
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